Using Sensor Redundancy in Vehicles and Smartphones for Driving Security and Safety by Ganesan, Arunkumaar
Using Sensor Redundancy
in Vehicles and Smartphones
for Driving Security and Safety
by
Arunkumaar Ganesan
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Computer Science and Engineering)
in The University of Michigan
2020
Doctoral Committee:
Professor Kang G. Shin, Chair
Professor Alex Halderman
Research Professor Peter Honeyman






to my wife and my family
ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
This PhD is not my own accomplishment. It is made possible by all those who
supported me, gave me confidence, and helped create a nurturing environment where
new ideas can grow and thrive.
First and foremost I am thankful for my advisor. Prof. Kang Shin had the dif-
ficult job of watching me repeatedly switch between different research topics before
he guided my attention towards the topic which eventually became this dissertation.
Prof. Shin generously gives his time and energy to each of his students and collabo-
rators.
I also want to thank my committee members for helping refine my thesis and
research.
I am thankful for my lab members. Doing a PhD has many ups and downs.
Sharing it with others who are undergoing the same experiences helped me persevere
and come out victorious. I am humbled by their intelligence, hard work and creativity.
Specifically I would like to thank Kassem Fawaz, Huan Feng, Yu-Chih Tung, Dongyao
Chen, and Kyu-Suk Han for joining me on this journey and being the source of many
new ideas.
I am grateful for the unconditional support and sometimes stern guidance of my
family. Doing a PhD is hard but it would have been much harder if my family wasn’t
always available providing silent moral support.
Finally, I am incredibly thankful for my wife. Evie has been a permanent source of
support and inspiration for all the years we’ve known each other. Her warm and kind
support has helped me through the hardest moments of my degree and encouraged
me to keep pushing.
iii
This thesis research has been supported in part by National Science Foundation




DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiv
ABSTRACT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xvi
CHAPTER
I. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 CAN-bus Injection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.1 CAN-bus Traffic Monitoring . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.2.2 Additional Hardware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.2.3 Modeling Specific Subsystems . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3 Detecting Stationary and Mobile Driving Hazards . . . . . . . 4
1.4 Vehicular Data Collection Platforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4.1 Specialized Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4.2 General Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.4.3 Reusable Data Collection Platforms . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5 Thesis Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.5.1 Exploratory Analysis of OBD-Sensor Redundancy . 7
1.5.2 CarSec: Using Smartphones as Car Security Assistants 8
1.5.3 Ubi: Using GPS Trajectories to Detect Driving Hazards 9
1.5.4 CAB: On-Demand Vehicular Data Collection Builder 10
II. Exploration in Leveraging OBD-Sensor Redundancy Within
and Across Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
v
2.1.1 IVBSS Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
2.1.2 Exploratory Methods Overview . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.1 In-vehicle Sensor Relationships . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.2.2 Across-vehicle Road-Level Anomalies . . . . . . . . 16
2.3 Exploratory Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.1 In-Vehicle: Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.3.2 Across-Vehicles: PCA and CA . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3.3 Principal Component Analysis (PCA) . . . . . . . . 19
2.3.4 Cluster Analysis (CA) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.4 Findings: In-Vehicle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.1 Across-Trip Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4.2 Vehicle- and Driver-Specific Models . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4.3 Within-Trip Consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.4.4 Hypothesis: Contextual Factors . . . . . . . . . . . 29
2.4.5 Cluster analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
2.4.6 Variation within each cluster . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.4.7 Detecting CAN-bus Injection Attacks . . . . . . . . 34
2.5 Findings: Across-Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.1 Observations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.5.2 Detecting Abnormal Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
2.5.3 Novel Anomalous Discoveries . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
2.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
III. CarSec: Using Smartphones as Car Security Assistants . . . . 43
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.2.1 Phone-based Estimation of Vehicular Sensors . . . . 47
3.2.2 Vehicular Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS) . . . . 48
3.3 Background and Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.3.1 Why Smartphones? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.3.2 Adversary Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
3.4 System Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.4.1 Speed . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.4.2 Steering Wheel Angle . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
3.4.3 Fuel Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.4 Gear Position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3.4.5 Engine RPM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
3.5.1 Evaluation Dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.2 Estimation Accuracy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.5.3 Sensor-Falsification Detection Accuracy . . . . . . . 66
3.5.4 Android Implementation and Evaluation . . . . . . 73
3.6 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
vi
3.7 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
IV. Ubi: Using GPS Trajectories to Detect Driving Hazards . . . 79
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.1.1 State-of-the-Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.1.2 Proposed Solution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.1.3 Ubi Operation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.1.4 Key Technical Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.1.5 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1.6 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.1.7 Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
4.2 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2.1 Direct: Hazard Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
4.2.2 Indirect: Detection based on GPS trajectories . . . 84
4.2.3 Graph-based anomaly detection . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.2.4 Crowd-sourced detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3 System Design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.3.1 Ubi System Input Output . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.2 Graph Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88
4.3.3 Using graph search to warn drivers . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4.1 Evaluation of the Warning System . . . . . . . . . . 93
4.4.2 Evaluation of Graph Search . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.5 Discussion and Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
V. CAB: On-demand Vehicular Data Collection Builder . . . . . . 105
5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
5.1.1 State of the Art . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.1.2 Proposed System: CAB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.1.3 Key Technical Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
5.1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.1.5 Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.2 Data-Collection Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.2.1 Design Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.3 System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.3.1 Algorithm Developer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
5.3.2 App Designer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
5.3.3 Experiment Participant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.4 Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
5.5 Demonstrative Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.5.1 Case Study 1 – GreenGPS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
5.5.2 Case Study 2 – Car Sensor Estimation . . . . . . . 123
vii
5.5.3 Case Study 3 – Obstacle/Hazard Warning . . . . . . 125
5.6 Evaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.7 User Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127
5.8 Related Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
5.8.1 Specialized Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.8.2 General Data Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 130
5.8.3 Reusable Data-Collection Platforms . . . . . . . . . 131
5.9 Discussion & Future Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
5.10 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
5.11 Appendix: Specification Files . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 134
VI. Thesis Contributions and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
VII. Interesting Future Direction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137




2.1 Three different approaches summarized. Each approach was well
suited for finding certain kinds of similarities between data. Pairwise
correlation found relationships across different kinds of sensor data.
CA and PCA modeled normal behavior for same kind of sensor data
across vehicles. The highlighted line for CA and PCA are time-series
examples which would be marked as anomalous using that approach.
Each approach is described in more detail in their respective section
below. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
2.2 CDFs describing the length of road segments and the number of trips
across segments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.3 PCA forward and inverse transformation where X ∈ Rn×p, V ∈ Rp×k 20
2.4 PCA-based anomaly detection technique applied to the IVBSS dataset. 21
2.5 Clusters found in the IVBSS dataset . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.6 The right two figures show the average change of each pair sensors
for one of the drivers in our database. The left two figures show
the correlation matrix for one of the trips for that driver. The top
row of figures correspond to the entire set of pairs. We selected the
pairs which correlate more often and tend to have lower variance in
the bottom two figures. The subset shown in the bottom two figures
are highlighted in yellow in the top two figures. The bounds in the
bottom right figure is the average change of that pair’s correlation
across trips for this driver. The axes labels have been removed due
to lack of space when unnecessary. (Best viewed in color) . . . . . . 26
2.7 The aggregate correlation of all trips across different drivers and dif-
ferent vehicles. The top figure shows the average correlation for all
9 drivers using vehicle 1. The bottom figure shows the average cor-
relation for all 16 vehicles. The ID in the X axis corresponds to the
pair of sensors in Table 2.3. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
ix
2.8 The distribution of pairwise correlation within a single trip. One
trip was divided into multiple 10-second segments. Each pairwise
correlation was calculated for each segment and shown above in the
scatter plot and the accompanying CDF. The colors in the scatter
plot correspond with the colored lines in the CDF. . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.9 Each trip for a driver was divided into 10 second windows. Within
each 10 second window, we calculated the correlation and used DB-
SCAN to find clusters. For this driver, DBSCAN identified two clusters. 31
2.10 Histogram of how many clusters we found for each of the contexts
specified in Table 2.4. For each driver, we collected all 10 second
time windows for their trips and ran DBSCAN on the final aggregate
plot. We used epsilon between clusters = 0.3 and minimum samples
within each cluster = 50 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
2.11 The percent of time windows which fall under a cluster across all
drivers for each context. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.12 The average standard deviation for unclustered and clustered trips
for each set of variables. We averaged the standard deviation of the
clustered and unclustered across all drivers in the IVBSS dataset.
In many cases, we found that clustering significantly reduces the
standard deviation of the pairwise correlation, therefore making it
a promising technique for attack detection. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
2.13 The bottom figure shows the attack on the speed sensor of the vehi-
cle. From 800-850 seconds, the vehicle speed is spoofed to appear as
though it is slowing down to 4 mph. Then it returns back to normal
after a few minutes. The attacked signal is in red and the original
trip is in blue. The top figure shows the normalized error (measured
as a multiple of the standard deviation) with and without clusters,
shown in red and blue respectively. The Y axis of the top figure is
drawn in log scale to highlight the difference between unclustered and
clustered cases. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
2.14 Illustrative examples highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of
each technique. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
2.15 Analysis of anomalous and normal data using PCA and CA . . . . . 37
2.16 Example anomalies for each road segment and each technique. The
anomalous trip is highlighted in bold. The sensor and the anomaly
scores are listed under each sub-figure. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.1 Three smartphone sensors are used to infer six different vehicular
properties. CarSec compares these inferred values with those re-
ported by the vehicle to detect sensor-falsification attacks. . . . . . 44
3.2 Sensor falsification attacks can be characterized in two axes:intention
and time sensitivity. The attack IDs are explained in Table 3.1. . . 53
3.3 Estimation error of vehicular sensors using CarSec. Each CDF shows
the estimation error of each trip along with the average error in a thick
black line. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
x
3.4 Estimation error using the passenger’s phone. The black horizontal
line shows the 50th and 95th percentile errors for each of these sensors
when the phone is more carefully mounted, as done in our previous
experiments. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
3.5 Vehicle speed estimation error for increasing high-frequency GPS
noise. For higher GPS noise, CarSec relies more and more on the
accelerometer component of the complementary filter. . . . . . . . . 63
3.6 Engine RPM and tire slip investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.7 Engine RPM and tire slip investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
3.8 Fuel estimation error drift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
3.9 The true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) of different
conditions. We considered gradual, sudden, and delta injections. See
Sec. 3.5.3.1 for more details. For each condition, we restricted the
maximum FPR and adjusted the parameters to yield the highest
TPR. As we reduced the FPR requirement, the TPR also suffered. . 68
3.10 ROC curve of 100 different combinations of the two parameters —
attack magnitude and duration. For each combination, we calculate
the FPR and TPR. A similar ROC curve was computed for each of
the 6 sensor estimations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
3.11 The left figure shows TPR for varying amounts of injection magni-
tude. The right figure shows varying fixed values of injection. At
the moment of the injection the vehicle sensor varies depending on
the scenario. For instance, in some cases the car was traveling at 10
kmph when there was a 4kmph injection. For all cases, FPR was less
than 5% and therefore omitted. Figure best seen in color. . . . . . . 72
3.12 Implementation details and measurements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
4.1 Ubi detects different driving hazards (shown in red) by collecting
GPS trajectories of vehicles around the hazard (shown in blue). This
operation is done in a cloud service and broadcast back to the drivers,
or to the proper authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
4.2 Ubi system components. Individual drivers upload their current lo-
cation and optionally a sighting of the hazard if they are nearby. Ubi
uses subsequent sightings to track the location of the hazard, and
returns the distance from the upcoming hazard. . . . . . . . . . . . 85
4.3 Ubi pseudocode. Ubi accepts a timestamped GPS location and whether
the hazard/obstacle was sighted at this location. If there is a sighting,
it updates the likelihood model. Otherwise, it predicts the current
location of the obstacle and warns the driver. The graph search al-
gorithm is described in more detail in Alg. 4.4. . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.4 Graph search used in Ubi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
4.5 The open space around the GPS trajectories are represented using a
network. Each node represents a potential location for the hazard. . 89
xi
4.6 An overview of the steps involved in detecting hazards in Ubi. This
example uses trajectories of simulated bumper cars where the hazard
is also a missing bumper car. This is chosen for ease of visualization.
The top row shows the overhead view during one time step. The bot-
tom row shows the full 3D graph where the Z axis is used to represent
time. The blue lines in the input represent the trajectory of the in-
put. The sightings are shown in red where the missing bumper car
was last seen. The third step (c) shows how the edges are connected
such that the hazard goes through the sightings. All outside nodes
and edges are excluded (Alg. 4.4 #6). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
4.8 Mobility models for 4 different hazard types. Each scatter plot rep-
resents the full range of possible movement in one time step with the
hazard starting at (0, 0). We also compared these with a stationary
obstacle that isn’t shown here. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91
4.9 The left figure shows the distance from the hazard. Vertical lines show
the time of the sightings of the hazard by all cars in the simulation,
which is also reflected in the right figure to show the location where
the sighting took place. The colored scatter points on the left figure
represent Ubi’s response to the driver, showing both the classification
and the distance to the hazard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
4.11 Accuracy and distance errors for varying density of cars. “Included”
results show the responses which included multiple hazards, including
the correct hazard. “Exclusive” results show the responses which only
warn the driver about the correct hazard. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
4.12 Accuracy and distance errors for varying GPS noise. The different
noise values were chosen from [52]. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
4.13 Heatmap of false positive rate for each hazard type. The number of
sightings varied from 1–6 and the density of cars changes from light
(250 cars per hour), medium (500 cars per hour) and dense (1000
cars per hour). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5.1 Three parties involved in CAB. Algorithm developers contribute code
to the CAB repository. App designers, which could be researchers or
app developers, submit high-level requirements. The CAB server takes
the available algorithms and automatically compiles a data-collection
app. The Experiment participant joins the data collection and installs
the data-collection app . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
5.2 CAB system architecture. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
xii
5.3 CAB uses several high-level configuration files to automatically gen-
erate data-collection platforms. Examples of all configuration files
are shown in the Appendix. It uses the script cl-algorithm to
convert the spec.json file into algorithm stubs to be filled in by
the algorithm developer. Using cl-strategy, it converts the high-
level requirements input by the app designer (requirements.json)
to get a detailed strategy file which lists all algorithms and depen-
dencies (strategy.json) to be included in the data collection app.
Finally, it uses cl-package to compile the data-collection app, build
the data-collection website, and initialize a virtual machine for each
data-collection platform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.4 Java algorithm implementation stub auto generated using CAB. A
similar function is auto generated for Python and React-based algo-
rithms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
5.5 Auto-generated code connecting different algorithms loaded for An-
droid. This file is auto-generated and doesn’t need to be edited by
the app designer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
5.6 The app designer inputs the high-level requirements using our web
interface (#1). This is translated to a JSON specification file (#2)
which is used by CAB to assemble the necessary algorithmic modules.
The dependency graph (#3) lists the compiled algorithmic modules
to meet this requirement. The user-input information is shown in
the gray boxes with a thick black border. The remaining information
(gray boxes), Android algorithms (green), React algorithms (blue)
and Python algorithms (pink) are automatically determined. CAB
uses the dependency graph to generate the individual components
for the data-collection platform (#4). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
5.7 All information and algorithms compiled together for a vehicle sensor
estimation case study. All information blocks are in gray. The input
required information are the three gray blocks with a thick border.
The remaining dependencies and all algorithms were determined by
CAB’s graph search. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
5.8 Obstacle avoidance/warning app built using CAB. The React algo-
rithm has a maps interface here it displays upcoming obstacles sightings-
map and outputs a new sighting if the user presses one of the three
buttons. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126
5.9 Lines of code contributed by developer compared to auto-generated
and library components. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 127




2.1 IVBSS data sources used in our experiments. All sensors were used
when calculating the pairwise correlation and the rows marked with
a → were used in creating normal models per-drivers. . . . . . . . . 13
2.2 Parameters and algorithms varied during cluster assignment search. 23
2.3 Highly correlated pairs, their average correlation and their average
change in correlation across trips for a single driver. Results were
similar for other drivers and is omitted. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
2.4 A subset of variables from the IVBSS dataset specifically chosen to
capture the context of aggressive driving. If the driver quickly applies
the brake or jolts the vehicle when accelerating or turning, we expect
to see a high positive or negative correlation among these pairs. . . 31
3.1 Example CAN bus injection attacks which require falsifying vehicular
sensors. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
3.2 Summary of estimation equations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
3.3 Driving dataset collected for evaluation of CarSec. We use the OpenXC
[36] platform to access the CAN bus data in all test vehicles. We col-
lected a total of 712.8 miles of data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
3.4 Specific injection values used in our analysis. The first five attacks
were injected as a sudden or gradual injection. The last four were
injected immediately as a delta of the actual value. See Sec. 3.5.3.1
for more details. These injection values were inspired by existing
literature and extend beyond them. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
5.1 Selection of studies which require data collection categorized by whether
the focus of the study is to model the driver, the environment or the
vehicle. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.2 Algorithms can be developed for 3 different platforms. All algorithms
share the common interface so data can be communicated across each
other seamlessly. Each algorithm is implemented in a language that
has typing support to enforce the proper formatting of information. 113
xiv
5.3 API endpoints exposed by the linking server. A new linking server is
started for each data collection application. All platforms (Android,
React and Python scripts) make HTTP calls to the linking server to
communicate information to other platforms. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
5.4 Developer-supplied code for each algorithm for vehicle estimation
demo app . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 124
xv
ABSTRACT
The average American spends around at least one hour driving every day. During
that time the driver utilizes various sensors to enhance their commute. Approximately
77% of smartphone users rely on navigation apps daily. Consumer grade OBD dongles
that collect vehicle sensor data to monitor safe driving habits are common.
Existing sensing applications pertaining to our drive are often separate from each
other and fail to learn from and utilize the information gained by other sensing streams
and other drivers. In order to best leverage the widespread use of sensing capabilities,
we have to unify and coordinate the different sensing streams in a meaningful way.
This dissertation explores and validates the following thesis: Sensing the same
phenomenon from multiple perspectives can enhance vehicle safety, secu-
rity and transportation.
First, it presents findings from an exploratory study on unifying vehicular sen-
sor streams. We explored combining sensory data from within one vehicle through
pairwise correlation and across multiple vehicles through normal models built with
principal component analysis and cluster analysis. Our findings from this exploratory
study motivated the rest of this thesis work on using sensor redundancy for CAN-bus
injection detection and driving hazard detection.
Second, we unify the phone sensors with vehicle sensors to detect CAN-bus in-
jection attacks that compromise vehicular sensor values. Specifically, we answer the
question: Are phone sensors accurate enough to detect typical CAN-bus injection at-
tacks found in literature? Through extensive tests we found that phone sensors are
sufficiently accurate to detect many CAN-bus injection attacks.
Third, we construct GPS trajectories from multiple vehicles nearby to find sta-
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tionary and mobile driving hazards such as a pothole or a bicyclist on the side of the
road. Such a tool will effectively extend the coverage of current navigation assistant
applications such as Google Maps which detect and warn drivers about upcoming
stationary hazards.
Finally, we present an easy-to-use tool to help developers and researchers quickly
build and prototype data-collection apps that naturally exploit sensing redundancy.
Overall, this thesis provides a unified basis for exploiting sensing redundancy






Our daily driving commute is heavily augmented with sensor data from our phones
and the vehicle’s internal sensors. Navigation apps direct our routes, steer us away
from traffic, and warn us of upcoming speed traps. The vehicle monitors its own
internal state to warn if there is something wrong with the engine or if the fuel level
is low. There are many commercially available OBD-dongles which provide statistics
such as our driving score [6, 101].
These sensing streams remain largely isolated from each other. We can provide
more useful functionality if we unify the different sensing modalities and integrate
them with neighboring cars. Successful applications of this kind of information shar-
ing have proven to be very useful in traffic prediction; over 77% of smartphone users
regularly use navigation apps [66]. By exploiting this spatio-temporal redundancy of
sensing information, we can enhance our daily lives.
In this thesis, we apply sensing redundancy to solve problems in two different
domains — CAN-bus injection detection and driving hazard detection. Furthermore,
we created a data collection app builder which makes it very easy for researchers
and developers to launch data collection campaigns which take advantage of these
naturally-existing redundancies. The following sections summarize the background
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and state of the art in these domains.
1.2 CAN-bus Injection
The most widely-studied form of vehicular cyber-attack is CAN-bus injection [69,
57, 46]. The CAN-bus is a broadcast-only bus connecting different electronic compo-
nents within the vehicle. By design, it doesn’t have sender authentication and uses a
very simple distributed medium-access protocol. This makes the CAN bus vulnerable
to injection and spoofing attacks. An attacker would first gain access to the CAN bus
through a variety of local or remote methods. Checkoway et al. [14] identified many
such entry points to the CAN bus, even including a malicious file on a CD that is
played through the infotainment system. The malicious file flashes a new firmware to
the infotainment ECU which gives the attacker the ability to read and write to the
CAN bus. Once the attacker has write access to the CAN bus, they have the ability
to cause damage by spoofing falsified sensor readings. For example, in one attack
demonstrated in [68], an attacker triggered the Park Assist system while the car is
moving by falsifying multiple sensor values over the CAN bus.
1.2.1 CAN-bus Traffic Monitoring
One approach to detecting and defending against CAN-bus injection attacks is
to monitor the CAN bus traffic and identify any abnormal patterns. These solutions
model the normal behavior using various statistics of CAN-bus packets. For example,
Müter et al. [72] uses CAN-bus entropy and Cho and Shin [20] use inter-packet arrival
time to model normal behavior. In the presence of an attack, the CAN bus would
exhibit abnormal behavior as the attack attempts to flood the bus with spoofed
packets. Some other solutions propose the use of cryptography in the CAN bus to
prevent injection attacks [43]. These solutions are thwarted by the attacker modifying
the attacked CAN traffic to mimic the realistic CAN traffic. In fact, attacks such as
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the Bootrom attack discussed in [68] change the CAN bus traffic to mimic realistic
traffic patterns.
1.2.2 Additional Hardware
Commercial vehicular intrusion detection systems often propose adding new com-
ponents inside the vehicle for IDS purposes [4, 89, 98]. These solutions require deep
integration into the vehicle which often increase the cost for the consumer. This
would be undesirable for all parties involved. Furthermore, they fail to exploit the
redundancy already present such as other vehicles or the user’s smartphone.
1.2.3 Modeling Specific Subsystems
Another class of systems detect CAN-bus intrusion by modeling sub-components
of the vehicle — Cho et al. [21] modeled the acceleration brake response of a vehicle
to detect compromised brake-by-wire systems and Wasicek and Weimerskirch [107]
modeled the engine torque response to detect chip tuning attacks — or by modeling
certain properties of the vehicle over road segments — Agamennoni et al. [2] modeled
the normal trajectory of vehicles and Jiang et al. [51] predict speed and traffic given
road-related properties. These methods all rely on in-vehicle information. If an
attacker has the ability to perform CAN-bus injection, they also have the ability to
spoof multiple sensor values in agreement with the model thereby evading detection.
We propose a solution for CAN-bus injection detection that overcomes these lim-
itations. Our solution uses information from the near-ubiquitous smartphones and
therefore provides an external source of knowledge to verify the sensors broadcast
within the vehicle.
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1.3 Detecting Stationary and Mobile Driving Hazards
Unseen and surprising hazards on the road lead to fatal accidents. There were
5,977 pedestrian deaths in 2017 in traffic accidents [27]. Early warning of upcoming
hazards will bring the driver’s attention to the road and help reduce such accidents.
A driving hazard can be stationary (e.g., stopped car), slow moving (e.g., pedestrian)
or even fast-moving objects (e.g., a reckless drunk driver).
Most existing work focuses on detecting stationary hazards on the road. Commer-
cial applications like Google Maps or Waze notify the driver of an upcoming stopped
car or a speed trap. Academic works also use IMU and GPS data to detect stationary
landmarks such as potholes [32, 91], speed bumps [3, 52, 7] or unprotected turns [16].
However these methods fail to detect moving hazards such as pedestrians, which has
led to thousands of pedestrian deaths in 2017 [27].
Other mobile hazards such as pedestrians or animals on the road do not actively
transmit their location therefore it is impossible to directly collect data from these
hazards in order to warn future drivers. They must be inferred through sensors. Us-
ing a camera or other vision-based sensors is currently the best way to detect these
hazards on the road. However, this is limited to vehicles equipped with these sophis-
ticated sensors and has its own challenges such as bad weather conditions occluding
the view.
A reckless driver is also a mobile hazard to other well-behaved drivers on the road.
Existing work on detecting dangerous drivers use in-vehicle data [45, 67, 117, 104, 116,
107], smartphone data [45, 113, 60, 61, 18], camera data [104, 61, 112, 96, 53] or GPS
trajectories from the reckless driver’s vehicle [115, 111, 47, 2, 78]. These methods fail
to detect the reckless driver if they disable the data collection mechanism. Ideally, we
need a method that can detect such driving hazards, whether stationary or mobile,
without requiring their explicit participation.
We propose a system that detects and tracks mobile driving hazards using only
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the GPS trajectories of nearby vehicles. This takes advantage of the near ubiquitous
GPS samples and can track stationary and mobile sensors even if they are not actively
broadcasting their location.
1.4 Vehicular Data Collection Platforms
Vehicular research spans a diverse set of areas including driver monitoring [87,
54, 96], road anomaly detection [32, 3, 103], and vehicular security [72, 49, 68].
Due to the lack of a very flexible reconfigurable data collection builder, most of
these researchers build their own data collection tools. This is a high barrier of
entry for non-technical researchers who would like to enter this field and investigate
vehicle-related research questions. Furthermore, since platforms are built for a specific
purpose, they often lack the flexibility to take advantage of redundant ways to measure
the same information.
Most data collection apps have similar requirements. They must all first access
and process low level sensor data from the vehicle or the phone. This requires under-
standing how to interface with different hardware devices and consolidating all the
information in one place. Next they often need to upload the data to a remote server
for later processing, and handle user management of the uploaded data. In many
cases, the data needs to be communicated between multiple aspects of the applica-
tion that is deployed on the user’s phone. A general data collection platform needs
to address these requirements.
We present an overview of the current state of vehicular data collection platforms
below.
1.4.1 Specialized Data Collection
Certain use cases require custom-built data collection tools and therefore cannot
be automated with a general, configurable tool builder. For instance, the IVBSS
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study [42] requires data from modified Honda Accords and Bender et al. [8] require
integration with the vehicle’s LiDAR and other sensors. Other data collection plat-
forms require adding sensors to vehicles. The Safety Pilot Model Deployment [10]
outfits cars with a DSRC antenna, an aftermarket safety device, and sometimes with
a MobileEye camera [100]. CANOPNR [95] is an OBD-II data logger built using Ar-
duino that can run local processing and offload the data to the cloud. This platform
was used to study slippery road conditions [30]. BigRoad [64] uses an easy-to-deploy
data collection platform [63] consisting of an IMU sensor attached to steering wheel
angle and a smartphone app. These research undertakings require a heavy engineering
effort and custom platforms to suit their special needs.
1.4.2 General Data Collection
Other vehicular research efforts can benefit from a general data collection builder
tool. For instance, SenseMyCity [84] is a crowd-sourcing mobile platform that collects
data from the smartphone and the vehicle through the OBD-II port. This has been
used to study city-wide fuel consumption [83] and the mental state of bus drivers [85].
Chen et al. [17] built V-Sense, which uses smartphone-based sensing to detect steering
maneuvers. Walhstörm et al. [103] include many such examples in their survey. These
investigations can be expedited by the existence of a simple data collection tool builder
that can be configured to meet their specific needs. This would enable non-technical
researchers to undertake similar research projects.
1.4.3 Reusable Data Collection Platforms
There are a few notable platforms that have been re-used across multiple inves-
tigations. The CarTel hardware data collection platform [48] was customized with
additional sensors and used in several follow-up works [31, 71, 32, 97]. However, this
platform wasn’t designed to be easily extended to additional use cases and must be
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manually modified for each investigation. In contrast, we develop a data collection
builder that is extensible for future required functionality.
Sensibility Testbed [82] has a web interface through which researchers can sub-
mit their data collection tasks. It automatically deploys the task to users who have
installed the Sensibility Testbed app. This tool makes it very easy to do data col-
lection, however it does not allow for developers to prototype any real-time custom
functionality on top of the data collection platform.
To meet these needs and facilitate vehicular research, we present a tool that can
be used to rapidly build data collection apps.
1.5 Thesis Contributions
In this dissertation we unify multiple sensing streams to the advantage of vehicular
safety and security. Each chapter of this dissertation contributes towards the following
thesis statement:
Sensing the same phenomenon from multiple perspectives can
enhance vehicle safety, security and transportation.
1.5.1 Exploratory Analysis of OBD-Sensor Redundancy
I started my exploration into sensor redundancy by investigating the sensors inside
the vehicle, often broadcast on the internal communication network. Working with a
dataset of 117 drivers, we had access to numerous vehicular sensors sampled at 100
ms for thousands of miles of driving. We use three different techniques to explore
relationships between this data.
First, we explored pairwise correlation between sensors within a vehicle, and ap-
plied that to CAN-bus injection detection. Natural redundancy occurs when the
same physical phenomenon causes related effects across multiple sensors. For in-
7
stance, pressing the accelerator pedal causes the engine to pump faster and increases
the speed of the vehicle. Engine RPM and vehicle speed respond in a related fashion
to the same cause, the accelerator pedal. We use pairwise correlation to study this
effect. We found that there is usually very high variation in pairwise correlation,
but if we restrict by context, this variation drops. We show that it can be useful to
detect some forms of CAN-bus injection but isn’t sufficient or a precise-enough tool
in general. This exploration lays the groundwork and gives rise to CarSec, presented
in a later chapter.
Next we model the normal behavior of sensors across vehicles in the same road
segment. We start with the hypothesis that as vehicles drive over the same road
segment, some of the sensors must react the same way to adapt to the geometric
constraints of the road. For example, the steering wheel must roughly match the
road curvature. We model this normal behavior on many sensors from the IVBSS
dataset using Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Cluster Analysis (CA). These
techniques find patterns in an unsupervised way and detect anomalies. Using these on
the vast dataset, we find that in a set of manually-labeled anomalous cases, PCA and
CA tend to find them as anomalous as well. Furthermore, PCA and CA are helpful in
isolating a small set of cases that seem suspicious or anomalous. Manually inspecting
those further helps us identify 12 cases of anomalous cases which were missed in
earlier analysis of this dataset. On the other hand, PCA and CA often flag many
additional cases as anomalous and cause false positives. These findings motivate the
development of Ubi, an automatic and more precise way to detect anomalies on the
road, presented in a later chapter.
1.5.2 CarSec: Using Smartphones as Car Security Assistants
Smartphones have increasingly sophisticated sensing capabilities and are ubiqui-
tous. This gives us a unique opportunity to leverage them for car-security purposes.
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In this work, we explore the hypothesis that smartphones can be used for de-
tecting CAN-bus injection attacks. We built a system called CarSec that uses three
smartphone sensors (magnetometer, IMU and GPS) to estimate six vehicular sensors
(speed, steering wheel angle, change in odometer, change in fuel level, gear and en-
gine RPM). By using smartphones for this purpose, we augment car-security at no
additional cost and introduce an external source of information from the car sensors.
In order to answer the hypothesis, we perform two evaluations. Firstly, we imple-
mented vehicle-estimation algorithms and measured their accuracy in a wide range
of scenarios. We collected over 900 miles of driving for many different cars and use
cases. We measured the accuracy of the vehicle estimation algorithms under such
conditions and showed that it is, indeed, quite accurate.
Secondly, we answered the question: How significant are CAN-bus injection at-
tacks? We surveyed CAN bus injection papers and characterized the types and mag-
nitude of common attacks. We evaluated the estimation algorithms of CarSec against
these attacks to show the strengths and limitations of using smartphones to detect
CAN-bus injection attacks.
1.5.3 Ubi: Using GPS Trajectories to Detect Driving Hazards
Navigation apps that use GPS to provide services are in widespread use. One study
found that 77% of users regularly use navigation apps during their commutes [66].
In addition to navigation functionality, these applications report upcoming objects of
interest such as a stopped car or a speed trap. Currently these reports are limited
to stationary obstacles and cannot report the presence of mobile hazards such as a
bicyclist on the side of the road or a reckless driver.
Detection of dangerous mobile hazards is difficult to achieve. The most common
approach is through direct sensing such as with a camera or a LiDAR. This requires
sophisticated computer vision and tracking, which is lacking in most older vehicles.
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Other approaches to detect dangerous drivers often require collecting GPS or IMU
data from the hazard in question. This becomes impossible if the mobile hazard (e.g.
an elusive reckless driver) purposefully disables the data collection or if the mobile
hazard naturally doesn’t collect any data (e.g. an animal on the road).
In this chapter, we address the problem of detecting mobile driving hazards. The
main intuition behind our approach is to model the behavior of vehicles around the
mobile driving hazard. For example, when approaching a bicyclist, cars tend to swerve
out of the way to avoid a collision. Someone driving up to the same location a few
minutes later will get an early warning that there is a bicyclist nearby and will receive
the estimated distance.
We detect hazards by modeling their location as a three-dimensional graph of
location (lat/lng) and time. As drivers sight the mobile hazard, we mark a node in
the 3D graph, and then simulate their location forward in time based on the likely
mobility of that hazard. As future cars approach this hazard, we use this predicted
location to warn other drivers of upcoming hazards.
1.5.4 CAB: On-Demand Vehicular Data Collection Builder
Vehicular research often requires building vehicular data collection applications.
Researchers tend to implement their own data collection platform for their specific
purposes. This creates a large barrier of entry for non-technical researchers and re-
sults in wasted effort as even technical researchers sometimes duplicate their efforts.
In this work, we built a data collection app builder which allows researchers with-
out programming expertise to quickly build and launch their own data collection
platforms.
Our data collection app builder, called CAB, defines information (data types about
users) and algorithms (implementations that produce that information). These def-
initions are language and platform-independent which allows us to define multiple
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redundant algorithms that may produce the same information. This allows decen-
tralized development of algorithms by multiple developers as long as they adhere to
the agreed-upon interface. We develop CAB and use it to build three collection apps
to show its expressivity and flexibility.
11
CHAPTER II
Exploration in Leveraging OBD-Sensor
Redundancy Within and Across Vehicles
2.1 Introduction
The vehicular CAN bus exposes numerous sensors about the vehicle state. A
sophisticated vehicle may also measure the outside such as the outside temperature or
the atmospheric pressure. In particular we explored three different ways of combining
the vehicular sensor data in order to gain increased functionality. This study is
an exploratory look at redundancy of different sensors within the same vehicle and
sensors across multiple vehicles.
2.1.1 IVBSS Dataset
All of our experiments were done on the Integrated Vehicle-Based Safety System
(IVBSS) database collected by the University of Michigan Transportation Research
Institute (UMTRI) [42]. IVBSS contains diverse data collected from 117 drivers
between April 2009 and May 2010 in Southeast Michigan. The purpose of this study
was to evaluate the impact of collision avoidance and other safety systems on driver
behavior. 16 vehicles (Honda Accord) were distributed to 117 drivers for 6 weeks and
extensive data was collected from each vehicle. The vehicles were equipped with a
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Sensors on the CAN bus
Sensor Units
→ Vehicle speed m/sec
Acceleration pedal %
→ Steering wheel deg
Brake On or Off
→ Throttle and Target Throttle %
Coolant temperature deg C
→ Engine speed rpm
→ Master cylinder pressure kpa





→ Acceleration in X, Y and Z m/s2
→ Yaw, Pitch and Roll deg
Yaw rate, Pitch rate, and Roll rate deg/sec
Table 2.1: IVBSS data sources used in our experiments. All sensors were used when
calculating the pairwise correlation and the rows marked with a → were used in
creating normal models per-drivers.
data acquisition system (DAS) and a custom-designed CAN bus for the purpose of
the study. Details of the DAS and data sources are provided in [88].
2.1.2 Exploratory Methods Overview
I explored the relationship between sensors using the three exploratory methods
summarized in Fig. 2.1.
Correlation. First I used Pearson’s pairwise correlation coefficient to study the
relationship between sensors in the same vehicle. The Pearson’s correlation coefficient
is defined as cov(X, Y )/(σ(X)σ(Y )) where σ is the standard deviation and cov is the
covariance of the two. I observed that multiple vehicle sensors seem correlated and
are caused by similar physical phenomenon. If we find a strong correlation coefficient,

















































(a) Pairwise correlation of
sensors within a vehicle.








(b) Cluster analysis (CA) of
same sensors across vehicles.









Figure 2.1: Three different approaches summarized. Each approach was well suited
for finding certain kinds of similarities between data. Pairwise correlation found
relationships across different kinds of sensor data. CA and PCA modeled normal
behavior for same kind of sensor data across vehicles. The highlighted line for CA
and PCA are time-series examples which would be marked as anomalous using that
approach. Each approach is described in more detail in their respective section below.
Application: CAN-bus injection attacks. The target application for this
approach was to detect CAN-bus injection attacks which might compromise one of
the sensors. If the correlation significantly differs from the normal case, then we can
detect the attack.
Cluster Analysis (CA). Next we explored using cluster analysis to model the
normal behavior of sensors across vehicles. In this approach, we collected multiple
instances of the sensor value for the same road segment. We applied DBSCAN and
K-Means to find the optimal cluster which maximizes the silhouette score. In some
cases, this approach helped us identify multiple distinct clusters corresponding to
different types of behavior (e.g. turning left or turning right).
Principal Component Analysis (PCA). We also used principal component
analysis to find normal behavior models across vehicles. Similar to the previous
approach, we collected multiple instances of the same sensor from different vehicles
over the same road segment. In contrast to CA, PCA was able to find anomalous
behaviors even if they are distributed within the same clusters of normal behavior,
as shown in the example in Fig. 2.1c.
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Application: Anomalous behavior detection. We used CA and PCA normal
models to find abnormal driving events in naturalistic data. These methods were
helpful in detecting reckless driving behavior or driving maneuvers to avoid deer.
2.2 Related Work
2.2.1 In-vehicle Sensor Relationships
We apply pairwise correlation of in-vehicular sensors towards detecting CAN-bus
injection attacks. Koscher et al. [57] demonstrated a wide range of vehicular attacks
that are enabled once the attacker can write to the CAN bus. Some of the reported
attacks are extremely safety critical such as disabling the brakes or killing the engine.
There are many defenses to detect CAN-bus injection attacks. Most related to our
work are methods which use sensor-sensor relationships to detect these attacks. Our
exploration of pairwise correlation for this application is along the spirit of these
methods.
Cho et al. [21] detect anomalies in the brake sub-system by modeling vehicle dy-
namics. They use a tire friction model and the current road condition to model
the expected braking behavior. We explored a broader set of sensors with pairwise
correlation. Liu et al. [62] detect anomalies in cyber-physical systems using a spa-
tiotemporal pattern network and a restricted Boltzman machine. They demonstrate
how their technique can detect anomalies in smart home monitoring environments,
where sensor values tend to be well-behaved and more bounded. In contrast with
this domain, vehicular sensors naturally express large variation, many of which may
be falsely considered as anomalous. Pajic et al. [77] develop an attack-resilient state
estimator which functions in the presence of sensor noise. They demonstrate this
on an automatic cruise-control for a ground vehicle. We explored using a general
pairwise correlation between sensors thereby avoiding the use of fine-tuned models
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for each sub system.
2.2.2 Across-vehicle Road-Level Anomalies
Agamennoni et al. [2] performed anomaly detection by building an expected tra-
jectory of the vehicle over individual road segments. They measured ‘trajectory’ by
the distance of the vehicle from the center of the lane. Likewise, we build normal mod-
els of multiple variables over road segments. In contrast to their work, we go beyond
just the trajectory and consider 11 different variables related to vehicle safety.
Jiang & Fei [51] use various road-related properties to predict the traffic and speed
of the vehicle. Our work collects data from individual road-segments, however, does
not rely on road-specific properties. Moreover, we model normal behavior of many
more sensors in addition to speed.
There are also numerous works which detect dangerous or anomalous driving
behavior. Zheng et al. [117] use cluster analysis to determine which factors lead to
near-crash scenarios in naturalistic data. They use K-Means to model the features
extracted from the vehicle speed and driver braking behavior. Similar to their work,
we apply cluster analysis to natural driving datasets. In contrast to their work, we
build situation-agnostic normal models using cluster analysis across road segments.
Many existing approaches detect dangerous driving by extracting features from
vehicles [45, 67, 117, 104, 116, 107], smartphone data [113, 60, 61, 45, 18], camera
data [112, 96, 53, 104, 61], or GPS trajectories [115, 111, 47, 2, 78]. In contrast to
these works, we explored automatically extracting normal models using PCA and CA
without restricting to individual sensors or extracting hand-crafted features from the




In this section we describe the three approaches in detail.
2.3.1 In-Vehicle: Correlation
We study pairwise correlation in the short-time scale — within trips — and the
larger time scale — across trips, drivers, and vehicles. The pairwise correlation coef-
ficient is defined in Eqn. 2.1.




Normal behavior causes related change within the vehicle. For instance, pressing
the accelerator pedal will result in an increase in the speed of the car, cause acceler-
ation in the forward direction, an increase in the engine RPM, and a gear shift for
automatic systems. However, in the presence of a fault or an attack, these relation-
ships will no longer hold. If an attacker spoofs the speed of the vehicle, that will no
longer correlate with the accelerator pedal behavior, and therefore can be identified
as anomalous.
We performed pairwise correlation between all variables from Table 2.1. The
variables are divided into two classes — sensors within the vehicle which are broadcast
on the CAN bus, and sensors from an external IMU/GPS system. Correlating both
external and internal sensors gives us additional redundancy and robustness of the
system. In order to successfully fool the system, the attacker has to compromise both
internal and external systems, thus increasing the threshold for a successful attack.
Based on the pairwise correlation matrix, we found unexpected and interesting
correlations of sensors for individual trips. In many trips the acceleration and brake
pedals are positively and negatively correlated with the pitch. This captures when the
vehicle slightly dips forward or backward when the driver depresses the acceleration
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pedal. We also found that the steering wheel angle is positively correlated with the
yaw rate and that the brake is negatively correlated with many variables such as
speed, throttle, engine speed and acceleration.
However, these correlations differ across multiple trips. To study this systemati-
cally, we explore which variables are consistently correlated for the same driver and
how this changes across different drivers and different cars. This is presented in the
next section.
2.3.2 Across-Vehicles: PCA and CA
The guiding principle behind PCA and CA is that vehicles tend to behave similarly
at the same location. Sensors such as the speed, steering angle, and IMU sensors are
largely determined by the road segment and direction of travel. The exact relationship
between road segment and these sensor values is complex. To model this relationship,
we rely on data from many vehicles traversing the same road segment.
We operationalize this idea by dividing the map into road segments and aggregat-
ing all trips over each road segment. A “road segment” is a stretch of road between
two intersections. It is defined this way because vehicles are more likely to enter or
exit a road at the intersection points, and therefore, in between intersections we will
likely have complete vehicle data. Complete data is useful when applying PCA or
CA to the group of trips. For each vehicle driving over the road segment, we sample
the sensor values for uniformly distributed points in the road segment.
We divide each road segment into 0.01 mile-long discrete units and average the
sensor value within each interval of 0.01 mile. For a segment that is N miles long, this
provides a vector of length L = bN/0.01c. Some road segments have up to several
hundred trips (including the same and different drivers). A “trip” is defined as one
drive over the road segment, whereas a “driver” refers to a person with a vehicle.
The distribution of number of trips traversing each road segment and the length
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(a) Number of trips over each segment (b) Length of each segment
Figure 2.2: CDFs describing the length of road segments and the number of trips
across segments.
of road segment in shown in Figs. 2.2a and 2.2b. Out of 68,507 road segments, 1,206
of them have at least 100 trips traversing them. 50% of the road segments have at
least 5 trips or more. 50% of the road segments are at least 0.083 mile long. We focus
on road segments which have at least 100 trips.
Both PCA and CA techniques yield different results and taken as a whole we have
a more comprehensive view of vehicular anomalies. In what follows, we describe the
details of both techniques and compare them in Sec. 2.5.
2.3.3 Principal Component Analysis (PCA)
PCA is commonly used for dimensionality reduction [11] and anomaly detection
[109, 102]. Given a set of points in an N -dimensional space, PCA finds a new set
of orthogonal vectors, called Principal Components (PCs), such that each vector, in
order, represents most of the remaining variance. The PCs form a basis of the N -
dimensional space and can be found by computing the eigenvectors of the covariance
matrix.
Each point in the dataset can be represented as a linear combination of the PCs,
as shown in Eq. (2.3) where X is the set of points, V is the top k eigenvectors, Z is
the projection of X to V and µ is the mean vector of points in X.
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Forward transformation




X̃V V −1 = ZV −1
X̃V V T = ZV T
X̃ = ZV T
X = ZV T + µ.
Figure 2.3: PCA forward and inverse transformation where X ∈ Rn×p, V ∈ Rp×k
If we use all eigenvectors (i.e., V ∈ Rp×p), we can fully reconstruct the original
dataset by the inverse transformation shown in Eq. (2.3). If we use a subset of the
eigenvectors (i.e., V ∈ Rp×k where k < p), the reconstructed dataset will be an
approximation of the original dataset. If most of the variance of X can be captured
using only k principal components, then X can be accurately approximated using
only the top k principal components.
In social network datasets, Viswanath et al. [102] observed that only 3–5 PCs are
required to explain 85% of the variance. Their original dataset captures user behavior
in social networks using 181–687 features. PCA-based anomaly detection exploits this
phenomenon by representing the original data using a small number of PCs that can
capture most of the variance. The key insight is that normally-behaved data can be
accurately approximated using the top few PCs whereas anomalous data points are
poorly approximated using the same number of PCs.
2.3.3.1 Application to vehicle behavior
We use this property to detect anomalies in vehicular data. First, we aggregate
all sensor data over individual road segments and discretize the signal into uniformly-
sampled sensor values, spaced 0.01 miles apart. Fig. 2.4a shows the speed values of
multiple trips over one road segment. Then, we apply PCA to represent the data
using the top N principal components that are needed to explain Perc Var = 95%
of the variance, shown in Fig. 2.4b. We vary Perc Var from 90% to 99%, and report
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(a) Aggregated speed values
over the same road segment.











(b) Speed values represented
using the top principal com-
ponent.











(c) Anomalous speed values
highlighted in black.
Figure 2.4: PCA-based anomaly detection technique applied to the IVBSS dataset.
the results later in this chapter.
We calculate the Euclidean distance between the original signal and the trans-
formed signal. The anomalous cases will have the greatest distance between the
original and the transformed points. Some of these anomalous data are darkened in
Fig. 2.4c.
2.3.3.2 Anomaly score
For each trip over a road segment we assigned an anomaly score for each sensor of
the vehicle. For one vehicle over one road segment, this means we have 11 anomaly
scores, one for each sensor in the vehicle. The “anomaly score” is the Euclidean
distance of the original signal from the transformed signal using the top PCs. It
is normalized by the standard deviation of all distances for each road segment and
sensor. The anomaly score gives us a unified way to compare anomalies between PCA
and cluster analysis presented in Section 2.3.4.
2.3.4 Cluster Analysis (CA)
This approach is motivated by the examples shown in Fig. 2.5. Fig. 2.5a shows the
steering wheel angle of multiple trips over one road segment. One set of trips start
21
0.00 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.05


























(a) Three clusters found in steering wheel
angle
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(b) Two clusters found in vehicle speed
Figure 2.5: Clusters found in the IVBSS dataset
with a largely positive steering wheel angle and then turn the wheel to the neutral
position, while another remains neutral all the way and the third set starts negative
becomes neutral. These three cases represent trips when drivers turn into the road
segment from the left, right, or continue straight onto the road segment. Similarly,
Fig. 2.5b shows two visible clusters in the speed of trips over one road segment.
Similar driving patterns are reflected in clusters in the IVBSS dataset. A trip
which fluctuates between multiple clusters may be anomalous. By finding the clusters,
we can detect such anomalies. We use unsupervised CA to identify clusters of vehicle
sensor data in each road segment. Furthermore, we flag data outside of all clusters
as anomalous.
2.3.4.1 Cluster assignment search
CA has numerous variants tailored for different kinds of data; see Xu et al. for a
thorough survey [109]. We vary many parameters and try two clustering algorithms
to find the best possible clustering assignment of the trips over each road segment.
Each cluster is evaluated using a relative measure called the silhouette score [25].
The silhouette score, defined in Eq. (2.2), compares the average distance of each
point to other points within the same cluster and the average distance of each point
to neighboring clusters. b(i) is the average distance of i to the nearest cluster. a(i)
is the average distance of i with other nodes in the same cluster. The silhouette
score ranges from -1 to 1. If it is negative, then the clusters overlap and they are not
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Transformation Values
Low-pass filter Yes or No
Dimensionality Reduction 99% PCA, 85% PCA, 75% PCA, 2 PC, high dimension
Algorithm Parameters
DBSCAN ε ∈ {0.01...3}, Min Samples ∈ {5, 10, 20}
K-Means (K-Means++ [5]) K ∈ {2, 3, 4, 5}





We chose the silhouette score because of the absence of ground truth data. Due to
this limitation, we cannot calculate the accuracy of each cluster assignment. Instead,
the silhouette score simply tells us if a well-defined cluster assignment exists in the
database. This is often used to fine-tune hyper-parameters in existing clustering
algorithms such as K-Means [86].
We varied two properties of signal transformations and applied two different clus-
tering algorithms to find the configuration with the highest silhouette score. This
search space is succinctly described in Table 2.2.
2.3.4.2 Signal Transformation
We first applied a low-pass filter to the vehicular signals. Some of the sensors
such as accelerometer values or steering wheel angle exhibit very high frequency noise.
We applied a low-pass filter to remove this noise such that two similar trips over a
road segment will appear more similar to the clustering algorithm. We also used PCA
to reduce the dimensionality of the signals before applying clustering algorithms.
We represented the signal using N PCs such that they explain 75%, 85% and 99%
of the variance. We also tried representing the signal using only 2 PCs and clustered
the raw high-dimensional signal.
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2.3.4.3 Clustering Algorithms
We explored two clustering algorithms – DBSCAN and K-Means (with K-
Means++ initialization). DBSCAN is a density-based clustering algorithm which
groups nearby points. DBSCAN requires two parameters, ε and Min Samples. ε is
the maximum distance between two points to be considered “nearby” each other.
Min Samples is the minimum number of samples required before a set of points is
considered a cluster. We varied these values to search for the optimal clustering as
shown in Table 2.2. We also varied the number of clusters for K-Means and considered
K = {2, 3, 4, 5}.
We chose these two clustering algorithms because of available computationally
effective implementations. In future work, we will explore alternate clustering al-
gorithms such as CLIQUE (for clustering high-dimensional data) and BIRCH (for
agglomerative clustering) [38].
2.3.4.4 Anomaly Score
Silhouette score is an indication of clear cluster structure. If the silhouette score
is above a threshold (e.g., 0.8), we suppose there are well-defined clusters and extract
points that are outside of all clusters. The “anomaly score” is the Euclidean dis-
tance from the nearest cluster normalized by the standard deviation of intra-cluster
distance. If the silhouette score is below the threshold, we assume there is no clear
cluster structure and simply measure the distance of all points from the average
point, normalized by the standard deviation. This way we detect very abnormally
distributed signals even if there is no clear cluster structure,
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2.4 Findings: In-Vehicle
In this section, we share the patterns we found through pairwise correlation within
the same vehicle.
2.4.1 Across-Trip Consistency
The correlation of sensors often changes between trips and drivers. We isolate
which variables remain highly positively or negatively correlated across all trips of
a single driver and explore the changes across multiple drivers. Fig. 2.6 shows the
correlation and average change of the correlation across all trips for a single driver.
From the full pair of sensors, we identified 14 pairs which have greater than 0.5 or
less than -0.5 Pearson’s correlation across all trips for at least one driver. The top
sensors and the corresponding average correlation matrix are shown in the bottom
row of Fig. 2.6 and listed in Table 2.3.
ID Variable 1 Variable 2 Avg Corr Avg δ
1 Speed GPS Speed 1.00 0.00
2 Accel Pedal Target Throttle 0.99 0.00
3 Throttle Target Throttle 0.99 0.01
4 Accel Pedal Throttle 0.98 0.02
5 Y Acc. Yaw Rate 0.82 0.07
6 Throttle Engine Speed 0.76 0.09
7 Target Throttle Engine Speed 0.77 0.06
8 Speed Engine Speed 0.75 0.09
9 GPS Speed Engine Speed 0.74 0.10
10 Accel Pedal Engine Speed 0.74 0.07
11 Steering Angle Yaw Rate 0.75 0.19
12 GPS Speed Gear 0.56 0.14
13 Brake Engine Speed -0.68 0.12
14 Speed Gear 0.55 0.14
Table 2.3: Highly correlated pairs, their average correlation and their average change
in correlation across trips for a single driver. Results were similar for other drivers
and is omitted.
Among the highly correlated variables, we found four pairs to be nearly 100%
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Figure 2.6: The right two figures show the average change of each pair sensors for
one of the drivers in our database. The left two figures show the correlation matrix
for one of the trips for that driver. The top row of figures correspond to the entire
set of pairs. We selected the pairs which correlate more often and tend to have lower
variance in the bottom two figures. The subset shown in the bottom two figures are
highlighted in yellow in the top two figures. The bounds in the bottom right figure
is the average change of that pair’s correlation across trips for this driver. The axes
labels have been removed due to lack of space when unnecessary. (Best viewed in
color)
positively correlated in nearly all the trips. These four were speed × GPS speed,
acceleration pedal × target throttle, throttle × target throttle, and acceleration pedal
× target throttle. The vehicles in our dataset broadcast the target throttle and
current throttle as separate values. Due to their high correlation, we can easily
detect if an attacker modifies one of the variables in a sustained attack that lasts
throughout the trip.
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2.4.2 Vehicle- and Driver-Specific Models
In Section 2.4.1, we explored the long-lasting cross correlation properties for differ-
ent pairs of sensors. We started to expand this to driver-specific and vehicle-specific
models of cross-correlation. Figure 2.7 compares the average correlation of the top








Figure 2.7: The aggregate correlation of all trips across different drivers and different
vehicles. The top figure shows the average correlation for all 9 drivers using vehicle
1. The bottom figure shows the average correlation for all 16 vehicles. The ID in the
X axis corresponds to the pair of sensors in Table 2.3.
First we computed the pairwise correlation across all data from a single driver,
and compared with other drivers. This is shown in the top half of the figure. The first
four pairs remain highly correlated for all drivers, however, other pairs vary across
drivers. For instance, between two drivers in the same vehicle, the correlation between
vehicle speed and engine speed varies by 0.17 (out of 1 being perfectly correlated)
and the correlation between steering wheel angle and yaw rate varies by 0.21. We
hypothesize that this is caused by driver-specific patterns such as how aggressively
the driver turns the steering wheel.
Second, we explored how these correlations vary across different vehicles. Each
vehicle has between 7–10 drivers and there are 16 vehicles in total. For each vehicle,
we computed the correlation of all pairwise sensor data to get an aggregate correlation
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value. This correlation is shown for all 16 vehicles in the bottom of Fig. 2.7. The
maximum difference between a pair of vehicles is 0.089 correlation between the brake
and engine speed.
This suggests that the changes in correlation is a driver-specific phenomenon and
not dependent on the vehicle. Therefore, we must learn this correlation matrix for
individual drivers before attempting to use it to detect spoofed sensor attack. We
can use the vehicle-specific model as a starting point and iteratively learn the driver-
specific model to improve detection.
2.4.3 Within-Trip Consistency























(a) Correlation variation of highly correlated variables
within one trip.

















(b) CDF of variation for select
pairs of variables
Figure 2.8: The distribution of pairwise correlation within a single trip. One trip was
divided into multiple 10-second segments. Each pairwise correlation was calculated
for each segment and shown above in the scatter plot and the accompanying CDF.
The colors in the scatter plot correspond with the colored lines in the CDF.
In order to use the correlation of sensors to detect real-time attacks, we must look
at the correlation matrix in a small time window in the current trip. If the current
time-window correlation differs from the expected, we can flag it as an attack.
In this section, we investigate the nature of within-trip correlation fluctuations.
Fig 2.8a shows the example variation within a trip of a subset of the highly-correlated
pairs from Table 2.3. We calculated the correlation within sliding window of 10
seconds for every second of the trip. The entire trip was 2 hours and 32 minutes long.
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Fig. 2.8b shows the CDF of the standard deviation of the correlation for each pair of
variables for this trip.
On average, we found considerable deviation. Some of the pairs, such as the
Throttle and Engine Speed, ranged from ≈-0.5 to 0.9 correlation for certain time
windows. We found a similar variability for other trips and other drivers. In the pre-
vious section we found that when aggregated across trips and drivers, the correlation
remains steady, however, if we look at small time windows within one trip, we found
there to be such high variability.
2.4.4 Hypothesis: Contextual Factors
We formed two hypotheses to explain this high variation within one trip: (1)
the variation is caused by different contexts of the driver, vehicle and surroundings
at each point in time, and (2) within a single context, the variability of the pairwise
correlations is much lower. If these hypotheses prove true, then we can use knowledge
of the current context to draw bounds for expected behavior and detect anomalous
behavior caused by attacks or other factors.
The above hypotheses are motivated by the following observation. Suppose the
vehicle goes through a tunnel for a part of the trip. The GPS connectivity will suffer
and it will report inaccurate location and speed. In this case, the correlation between
the GPS-speed and the vehicle speed will be much lower than what is normally
seen. Therefore, the context “out of GPS range” leads to a change in the correlation
behavior.
Similarly, if the driver is going up-hill versus down-hill, there will be different
measurements in the short time-window correlation. If going up-hill, the driver has
to apply the acceleration pedal to maintain the speed of the car, but if he or she
is going down-hill, then the car is more likely to maintain the speed without much
application of the acceleration pedal. For up-hill, the correlation between acceleration
29
pedal and change in speed of the car will be more correlated. In this example, the
context is “road incline”.
We developed the tools to ask our database whether such contexts exist and
whether our above two hypotheses are correct. We present our results below and
report on the amount of standard deviation within each context.
2.4.5 Cluster analysis
We modeled the idea of contexts using clusters of the correlations found across
trips. We divided each trip into 10 second windows and calculated the correlations of
certain pairs of sensors. We treat this as a point in anN -dimensional space, whereN is
the number of pairs being considered. We applied DBSCAN [33] to identify clusters
in this N -dimensional space. By looking for clusters in this N -dimensional space
as opposed to individual pairs, we are able to capture richer relationships between
variables.
We chose a subset of the variable pairs from Table 2.1 which are likely to capture
different contexts and calculated the correlations across multiple time windows for
each driver, shown in Table 2.3. In addition, we explored the variables shown in
Table 2.4. We chose these pairs – such as brake and master cylinder pressure – to
better capture the context of aggressive or sudden driving. If the brake is applied in
a forceful and sudden fashion, the master cylinder pressure will increase rapidly.
Fig 2.9 shows clusters for one of the drivers in our database for the sensor pairs in
Table 2.4. We split each trip into 10 second windows and ran DBSCAN with ε=0.2
and min samples required to form a cluster = 100.
In Fig. 2.9, we can see the presence of two clusters. The right side of Fig. 2.9
shows the average correlation and standard deviation of members of each cluster. In
the green cluster, the brake and master cylinder pressure were much more correlated
when compared to the brown cluster. The pitch was also more positively and more
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(a) Two clusters emerge in the pairwise cor-
relation. (Best viewed in color)






















(b) The average value and the standard de-
viation for each pair of variables.
Figure 2.9: Each trip for a driver was divided into 10 second windows. Within each
10 second window, we calculated the correlation and used DBSCAN to find clusters.
For this driver, DBSCAN identified two clusters.
negatively correlated with brake and accelerator pedal respectively, when compared
to the the brown cluster.
The average inter-cluster distance is 0.99 and the intra-cluster distance is 0.41,
strongly suggesting the presence of well-defined clusters. The standard deviation
of individual pairs within each cluster is quite small. For example, the standard
deviation of the brake and master cylinder pressure is 0.06 for the green cluster and
0.05 for the brown cluster. However, when both are considered together, the standard
deviation is much larger — 0.41 in total.
Aggressive Driving
ID Variable 1 Variable 2
C1 Accelerator pedal Pitch rate
C2 Brake Master cylinder pressure
C3 Brake Pitch
C4 Steer Yaw rate
C5 Accelerator pedal Pitch
Table 2.4: A subset of variables from the IVBSS dataset specifically chosen to capture
the context of aggressive driving. If the driver quickly applies the brake or jolts the
vehicle when accelerating or turning, we expect to see a high positive or negative
correlation among these pairs.
For the variables in Table 2.3 and in Table 2.4, we examined all 117 drivers in
our database for the presence of clusters. For each driver, we used a 10 second time
window through their trips and generated correlation signatures. For all experiments,
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we empirically set the DBSCAN parameters to ε=0.1 and minimum points for a clus-
ter=50. We fed this into the clustering algorithm and measured how many clusters
are found for each driver. As shown in Fig. 2.10, clustering with Table 2.4 predom-
inantly yields two clusters (59 drivers) and for all but one driver, it finds 2 or more
clusters. Clustering with Table 2.3 yields a wider spread of clusters. For 22 drivers,
it only identified 1 cluster, and identified at least 2 for the remaining.
The different number of clusters for different drivers can be explained by the types
of data encountered by that driver. For example, if a driver lives near a tunnel and
often drives through the tunnel, then a new cluster will form when they leave GPS
range. Deeper manual inspection is part of our future work.



















Figure 2.10: Histogram of how many clusters we found for each of the contexts
specified in Table 2.4. For each driver, we collected all 10 second time windows for
their trips and ran DBSCAN on the final aggregate plot. We used epsilon between
clusters = 0.3 and minimum samples within each cluster = 50
Fig. 2.11 shows what percent of the time windows within a single trip are fall into
one of the clusters or are marked as unclustered. Even if we find multiple clusters
for a driver, it is possible that a subset of the 10-second time windows for that driver
are actually unclustered by the DBSCAN algorithm. Fig 2.11 shows that 50% of the
trips are clustered 51.4% of the time for Table 2.3 and 50% of the trips are clustered
62.4% of the time for Table 2.4.
Variables in Table 2.4 more consistently have two cluster and more of their trips
fall under one of these clusters compared to Table 2.3. This highlights the impor-
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tance of choosing the right variables when searching for clusters. The proper choice
of variables is part of our future work. This is a challenging problem because we
cannot exhaustively search through all subsets of variables (powerset of the variables
is a combinatorial explosion) and must resort to heuristics or other simplifying trans-
formations to reduce the search space.
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Figure 2.11: The percent of time windows which fall under a cluster across all drivers
for each context.
From these results we conclude that (1) clusters exist in the distribution of cor-
relation data and that (2) majority of the time-window correlations fall inside these
clusters. In future work, we will form the connection between clusters and contexts.
For the purposes our analysis, if we can detect the cluster which belongs to a par-
ticular time in the drive (based on contextual clues such as “GPS is out of range”),
then we can more tightly bound the expected pairwise correlation values.
2.4.6 Variation within each cluster
In the previous section, we established the presence of clusters and that a large
portion of time-windows within a trip falls in one of these clusters. In this section,
investigate the second hypothesis formed above – the variability within a cluster re-
mains small compared to across clusters. If the variability is low, we can form a
tighter bound of expected behavior and detect an attack more easily.
Fig. 2.12a and Fig. 2.12b show the change in standard deviation when clustering
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the trip data for variables in Table 2.3 and Table 2.4 respectively. The figures show
the standard deviation of the unclustered trips and the average standard deviation
of all the clusters for both variable sets. For Table 2.4, clusters reduce the standard
deviation to 15.5% of the unclustered standard deviation in the best case, and 91%
in the worst case. For Table 2.3, they reduce the standard deviation to 19.8% in the
best case and 50.6% in the worst case.

























(a) Variables from Table 2.4
























(b) Variables from Table 2.3
Figure 2.12: The average standard deviation for unclustered and clustered trips for
each set of variables. We averaged the standard deviation of the clustered and un-
clustered across all drivers in the IVBSS dataset. In many cases, we found that
clustering significantly reduces the standard deviation of the pairwise correlation,
therefore making it a promising technique for attack detection.
2.4.7 Detecting CAN-bus Injection Attacks
In this section, we leverage our understanding of clusters and pairwise correlations
to detect an anomaly which may be caused by a malicious attack or a system fault.
For each time window, the context is first determined and the cluster describing that
context is identified. The exact method of identifying the current context is outside
the scope of this work. Then, we compared the current pairwise cross-correlation
with the expected values for that cluster. For each pair, we calculated the deviation
from the mean correlation value for that cluster and reports it in terms of number of
standard deviations from the mean.
To test this idea, we spoofed the speed of the vehicle by modifying collected vehicle
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Figure 2.13: The bottom figure shows the attack on the speed sensor of the vehicle.
From 800-850 seconds, the vehicle speed is spoofed to appear as though it is slowing
down to 4 mph. Then it returns back to normal after a few minutes. The attacked
signal is in red and the original trip is in blue. The top figure shows the normalized
error (measured as a multiple of the standard deviation) with and without clusters,
shown in red and blue respectively. The Y axis of the top figure is drawn in log scale
to highlight the difference between unclustered and clustered cases.
traces. In our attack, the attacker injects fake speed values into the CAN bus for 50
seconds from 800-850. He brings the speed down from the current speed to 4 mph in
that time frame. Then he stops the attack and the vehicle resumes to broadcast the
correct value. Our attack and our detection results are shown in Fig. 2.13.
When we consider the context and cluster, we notice a considerable spike imme-
diately at the attacked time. The error rises to 106.6 times the standard deviation
for that cluster. However, when we fail to consider the cluster, the error only rises to
4.59 times the standard deviation, which is below the cut off point to be considered
an attack.
This result shows the possibility of using pairwise correlation to detect CAN-bus
injection, however this is a very noisy way to perform this analysis. This requires
finding the right set of sensors which may form well-defined clusters, and even after
doing so, the pairwise correlation sometimes rises to 3.05× and 4.48× the baseline
for non-injected data. We concluded from this result that pairwise correlation is not
well-suited for CAN-bus injection and explored alternate methods in follow up work,
also included in this thesis.
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Figure 2.14: Illustrative examples highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of each
technique.
2.5 Findings: Across-Vehicles
We evaluate the accuracy of the anomalies detected through PCA and CA by
comparing it with manually annotated cases of abnormal driving. As part of the
IVBSS project [42], several researchers manually reviewed the video footage of drivers
and vehicles to explain the root cause of forward collision warnings (FCW) and lane
departure warnings (LDW). They identified 139 instances of abnormal behavior which
triggered FCW or LDW. These include deer or other animals jumping in front of the
car, texting while driving, excessive speeding or skidding out of control. We used
PCA and CA to calculate the anomaly score of these instances compared to normal
behavior. We first present the overall accuracy of PCA/CA and then delve deeper
into the evaluation of cluster and PCA-based anomaly detection techniques.
2.5.1 Observations
At a high level, CA finds sets of similar behavior over each road segment. Anoma-
lies detected using CA are outside of all sets of common behavior. PCA finds the
common shape of the data signals. Therefore, anomalies detected using PCA are
cases where the driver’s behavior seems abnormal, even if it is within the bounds of
other normally-distributed trips.
Figure 2.14 illustrates the different strengths and weaknesses of PCA and CA.
Figure 2.14b shows an example where CA would flag the anomaly but PCA would
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(c) 90-th percentile increase in
anomaly score for abnormal
versus normal cases.
Figure 2.15: Analysis of anomalous and normal data using PCA and CA
miss it. The abnormal time series signal is clearly abnormal and much higher than the
others in the set. However, since they all share the same shape, the “abnormal” case
can be well represented using linear combinations of the top principal component.
Because of this, PCA-based techniques would fail to flag this anomaly. Figure 2.14a
shows an example of an anomaly that is better detected using PCA but would be
missed by CA. The abnormal time series signal is well within the bounds of the others
in the same set. However, due to their abnormal shape, PCA would be unable to
reconstruct this using the top principal component, therefore correctly identifying the
anomaly.
2.5.2 Detecting Abnormal Cases
We created two sets of data for abnormal and normal driving. Using the manually-
annotated cases described above, we collected 139 instances of “abnormal driving”.
These cases triggered the forward collision warning, lane departure warning, or caused
sudden changes in brake pressure. Along the same road segment, we collected the
remaining trips and marked them as “normal driving”. Note that this is an imperfect
labeling of the data since the remaining trips might also contain some abnormal
cases that was missed by FCW or LDW. For instance, swerving at night is abnormal
behavior but is unlikely to set off the lane departure warning if the lane is not visible.
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As shown in Fig. 2.15, abnormal cases resulted in a much higher anomaly score for
most sensors than normal cases. We measured the distribution of anomaly score for
both abnormal and normal cases, for both CA and PCA. The example distribution
is shown in Fig. 2.15a. This example is the distribution of anomaly scores for the
Engine Speed calculated using our cluster-based technique. On average, the anomaly
score is 52.7% higher for abnormal cases than normal cases. At the 90-th percentile
of cases, the anomaly score is 54.9% higher.
At the 50-th percentile, there is a 34.6% and 19.9% increase in anomaly score
across all sensors for CA and PCA, respectively. This is shown in Figure 2.15b. Note
that the Y -axis is capped at 1. Cluster-based techniques found a 357.9% increase in
anomaly scores for the Gear sensor. Moreover, we found an increase of 23.4% and
42.8% for cluster-based and PCA-based techniques for the 90-th percentile cases.
Cluster-based techniques are better suited at finding anomalies in the Engine
Speed, master cylinder pressure (MCP) and X-acceleration from the accelerometer.
During anomalous cases, these sensors tend to deviate largely from other values. For
instance, when the driver suddenly brakes, the MCP spikes up much higher than
other drivers on the same road segment. Therefore, these cases are easily detected by
clustering similar dense behavior together and detecting the anomaly.
On the other hand, PCA-based techniques are better suited for Vehicle Speed,
Steering wheel angle, Yaw, Pitch, and Roll. Even during anomalous driving, these
sensors tend to remain within bounds of what is considered normal behavior, but the
pattern of the sensor will differ from traditional cases. For instance, when skidding,
the driver might have trouble stopping the car and make a sudden stop. This is
within the bounds of normal driving as a vehicle can come to a stop for normal
reasons. However, the pattern of suddenly stopping is unusual and will be flagged
using PCA-based techniques.
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2.5.3 Novel Anomalous Discoveries
We apply PCA and CA to identify novel anomalous cases in the IVBSS dataset;
we identified 12 additional anomalous cases using these techniques.
Using CA, we discovered and manually verified 8 additional cases of anomalies
— 2 abrupt and dangerous lane changes, 2 single lane vehicle overtake maneuver,
2 sudden deviation to avoid hitting another vehicle, and 2 aggressive speeding and
reckless driving. For one of the reckless driving instances, 4 out of 10 sensors were
flagged as anomalous using CA (Throttle, Engine speed, Y-acceleration, and Steering
angle). These are shown in Figures 2.16a, 2.16b, 2.16c, and 2.16d. In this instance,
the driver merges onto the highway and speeds through the ramp. Once he merges
onto the highway, he suddenly turns the steering wheel to enter the adjacent lane. At
times, he speeds beyond 100 mph. This case was not previously manually identified
because it did not trigger a lane departure warning or forward collision warning.
Using PCA, we discovered 6 cases of anomalous driving — 2 dangerous lane chang-
ing and swerving, 1 speeding, 1 sudden braking due to texting, and 2 sudden deviation
to avoid hitting another vehicle. In one of the cases, we found that 5 out of 10 sensors
were flagged as anomalous (Engine speed, pitch, Gear, Throttle, and Vehicle speed).
This instance is shown in Figures 2.16e, 2.16f, 2.16g, 2.16h, and 2.16i. The driver
changed two lanes in a busy highway driving very close to other vehicles. This be-
havior was unnatural for this part of the road and was flagged as anomalous using
PCA. The sensor values were close to the normal bounds therefore CA did not assign
a large anomaly score.
Two cases of anomalous driving were flagged by both PCA and CA. In both of
these instances, the drivers quickly swerve out of the way to avoid hitting another
vehicle. For the first instance, we found a CA-based anomaly in the Throttle position
and a PCA-based anomaly in the Engine Speed. In the second instance, we found
a CA and PCA-based anomaly in the MC Pressure. These are all shown in Fig-
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ures 2.16j, 2.16k and 2.16l. This result demonstrates that PCA and CA may find the
same trips and sensor values as anomalous. However, we discovered the remaining
10 cases using either CA or PCA independently; these two techniques can be used to
complement each other in discovering anomalous driving behavior.
2.6 Conclusion
In our exploratory analysis of in-vehicular sensors, we found that pairwise corre-
lation, principal component analysis and cluster analysis yielded interesting patterns
and models.
In-Vehicle Pairwise Correlation In the macroscopic scale, there is low vari-
ability of pairwise correlations across trips, drivers and vehicles. However, there is
considerable variability of pairwise correlation within time windows of a single trip.
We studied the cause of this variability and identified the presence of clusters which
correspond to contexts of the driver or vehicle. Within a cluster, there is lower vari-
ability than compared to across clusters.
Overall we concluded that pairwise correlation may be too coarse-grained of a
technique to be useful for attack detection. Even after reducing the variability through
cluster analysis, the CAN-bus injection detection is very noisy and often incorrect.
This exploratory analysis led us to leveraging the smartphone for CAN-bus injection,
presented in Chapter III.
Across-Vehicle PCA and CA We used two different techniques to identify dif-
ferent kinds of anomalies — Principal Component Analysis (PCA) and Cluster Anal-
ysis (CA). We applied these to the Integrated Vehicle-Based Safety System (IVBSS)
dataset consisting of 117 drivers and over 200,000 miles of driving behavior. On a
manually labeled subset of the data, CA and PCA assigned on average a ≈ 30%
higher anomaly score to abnormal cases. However, although the anomaly score was
higher on average for these anomolous cases, it was also lower during a subset of the
40
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
















CA= 7.02, PCA = 5.27
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6













CA = 7.75, PCA = 0
0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6











(c) Steering Wheel Angle
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Figure 2.16: Example anomalies for each road segment and each technique. The
anomalous trip is highlighted in bold. The sensor and the anomaly scores are listed
under each sub-figure.
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data. This leads to false positives through this technique.
Furthermore, we used this approach identify 12 new abnormal cases which were
previously missed in manual analysis. We found that PCA and CA are best suited for
narrowing down the driving data which seems anomalous. Using these approaches,
we found a short list of ≈ 100 anomalous cases flagged by our technique and identified
the 12 cases presented here. Without our tool, it may be impossible to sift through
the large amounts of data to find these unique cases.
Due to the limitations of using PCA and CA for anomaly detection, this work
led us to focus on detecting a more specific kind of anomaly caused by mobile and
stationary hazards on the road. We narrowed our focus to road-based anomalies
specifically in GPS trajectories of nearby vehicles in order to find mobile hazards.
That work is explained in Chapter IV.
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CHAPTER III
CarSec: Using Smartphones as Car Security
Assistants
3.1 Introduction
Cyber attacks on cars are now a very real and serious threat. In recent years,
researchers have demonstrated numerous vulnerabilities which allow an attacker to
take control of a vehicle and put drivers and passengers at peril [14, 37, 69, 68].
Most of these attacks involve injecting falsified sensor data into the Controller Area
Network (CAN), the de facto communication network within a vehicle, and hence the
first and foremost step in their defense is to detect these falsified sensor values.
While there are many proposals of increased security in future vehicles, we need
to enhance security and safety in cars on the roads today. In particular, we need
a system which can be used immediately by passengers to enhance their sense of
confidence in the security and safety of their vehicle.
State-of-the-art. Existing security assistant proposals fail to meet this press-
ing need of increased security in today’s cars. They usually detect these in-vehicle
attacks by modeling packet-arrival characteristics within the vehicle [20, 73] or the
relationships between in-vehicle sensors [21, 39]. If the vehicle is compromised, both
























Figure 3.1: Three smartphone sensors are used to infer six different vehicular prop-
erties. CarSec compares these inferred values with those reported by the vehicle to
detect sensor-falsification attacks.
in-vehicle sensor data. There has also been a strong commercial push for vehicular
intrusion detection systems, but they all require deep integration with the vehicle
hardware, making their integration with existing vehicles prohibitively expensive [4,
89, 98].
Proposed Solution. We propose a new security assistant called CarSec to fill
this need. The first step of many of the vehicular attacks reported in literature involves
injecting falsified sensor data into the CAN bus. CarSec independently acquires these
sensor values using the smartphone’s sensors and cross-validates them with what is
seen in the CAN bus. By doing so, CarSec adds a second layer of assurance in the
vehicle’s sensor values on CAN, and can quickly identify when sensor falsification is
taking place. CarSec can be used in tandem with other security measures to detect
and defend against the emerging threat of vehicular cyber attacks.
Smartphones have proven successful in assisting with other vehicular tasks such
as dangerous driving detection [45, 67, 60, 113, 29], road monitoring [32, 47, 92,
118, 40], and trajectory mining [23, 106, 12, 65]. We expand the use of smartphones
to enhance vehicular security by detecting sensor-falsification attacks. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first application of smartphones for vehicular security
assistance.
One of the main advantages of CarSec is its ease of deployment at no additional
cost. A driver simply installs the CarSec app from the app market, and pairs it
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with a Bluetooth OBD dongle which reads values from the vehicle’s CAN bus. The
read-only OBD dongle simply relays the information it sees in the CAN bus to the
phone, thereby not contributing to the attack surface. CarSec runs automatically
in the background to independently acquire vehicle sensors on the CAN bus via a
dongle and cross-validate them. Since almost everyone carries a smartphone these
days, we can use both driver’s and passenger’s phones to increase the available sensor
redundancy at no additional cost.
By implementing CarSec on a smartphone, we provide this additional security to
drivers today. The smartphone serves as an external source of knowledge about ve-
hicular dynamics, thereby overcoming the above-mentioned limitation of sole-reliance
on in-vehicle sensor data. Furthermore, CarSec capitalizes on the existing hardware
and computing power of smartphones. This can be used in addition to commercial
solutions, if any, which provide enhanced protection but require deeper and more
expensive integration with the vehicle.
Key Challenges and Solutions. In order to use smartphones to detect vehicular
sensor-falsification attacks, we have to estimate vehicular values and compare them
with the sensor values on the CAN bus.
Challenges in Evaluating Falsification Attacks There exists a dearth of eval-
uation metrics for CAN-bus injection or falsification attacks, even though injection
attacks are often a necessary step before achieving vehicular compromise. To solve
this lack of benchmarks, we survey existing literature on vehicular cyber-attacks and
identify some of the more common sensor-falsification attacks. We categorize this
into different types of falsification attacks, and evaluate CarSec against these attacks
to demonstrate its effectiveness in a realistic scenario.
Challenges in Estimating Vehicular Sensor Values Estimating the readings of
vehicle sensors using smartphone sensors requires a robust method which is resilient
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to common phone usage. Prior work on vehicle sensor estimation requires data from
installed sensors and has not addressed the difficulties associated with common phone-
based movements [64, 94]. In contrast, using the vehicle’s physical dynamics models
(e.g., Ackerman model [64]), publicly available vehicle specifications from the OEMs
(e.g., gear ratios), and sensor fusion techniques (e.g., complementary filter, neural
network), we have built a system that is robust to common phone usage/movements.
We demonstrate this through extensive experiments.
Furthermore, to overcome the lack of a well-defined vehicle model for estimating
the current gear position, we have developed a neural network to predict the gear
position given the change in recent speed.
Key Findings. We have implemented CarSec in Android and evaluated it against
sensor-falsification attacks. We evaluated CarSec by injecting three types of sensor-
falsification attacks reported in literature — sudden, gradual, and delta injections —
in real-world driving traces. CarSec is shown to be capable of detecting falsifications
of 6 vehicular sensors with different levels of true positive rate (TPR), ranging from
97.33% for speed sensors to 78.29% for RPM falsifications, with very low false positive
rate (FPR), often set to less than 1% FPR. CarSec can most accurately detect speed,
gear position, fuel and odometer falsifications.
Furthermore, CarSec only consumes ≈8% of the CPU on average, even while
performing expensive neural network-based sensor estimation algorithms.
This chapter makes the following main contributions:
• Thorough characterization of CAN-bus sensor falsification attacks. We survey
the literature on vehicular cybersecurity to create a taxonomy of different at-
tacks on vehicular CAN bus. This taxonomy of attacks will guide future research
into defenses against such attacks.
• Extensive evaluation of vehicle sensor estimation algorithms under diverse real-
istic situations. We show the robustness of vehicle sensor estimation algorithms
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on 6 different vehicles, 912 miles of driving, and under 4 different common uses
of the phone by 7 different passengers.
• Expansion of vehicle estimation research. We extend prior work on vehicle
estimation by (a) developing a novel neural-network based gear-estimation al-
gorithm and (b) investigating the failure modes of engine RPM estimation using
prior methods.
• Development and evaluation of CarSec a novel system to detect CAN-bus in-
jection attacks. We use phone-based vehicle sensor estimation to detect CAN-
bus injection attacks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first to apply
phone-based vehicle estimation algorithms for the detection of CAN-bus sen-
sor falsification attacks. We also demonstrate its computational feasibility with
an efficient Android implementation and provide source code facilitating future
follow-up research in this area.
Paper Organization. The chapter is structured as follows. Sec. 4.2 reviews
other related IDS solutions while Sec. 3.3 presents the necessary background and
attack model. Next we describe CarSec in Sec. 4.3 and evaluate it against simulated
and realistic attacks in Sec. 3.5. Finally, we discuss limitations of current CarSec and
future work in Sec. 4.5, and conclude the chapter in Sec. 4.6.
3.2 Related Work
3.2.1 Phone-based Estimation of Vehicular Sensors
There are numerous studies which estimate vehicular sensors using phone sensors
for dangerous driving detection [45, 67, 60, 113, 29], road monitoring [32, 47, 92,
118, 40], and trajectory mining [23, 106, 12, 65]. In contrast to these studies, we
explore if phone sensing can be used to enhance security. Thus, the evaluation for
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this exploration is very different from existing studies.
3.2.2 Vehicular Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS)
These fall under two main categories, CAN-bus traffic characterization and vehic-
ular sensor modeling, both of which essentially rely on vehicular sensors and are thus
vulnerable to compromise.
3.2.2.1 CAN-bus Traffic Characterization
Müter et al. [72, 73] developed an IDS which models information-theoretic and
structural patterns of the CAN bus under normal behavior. During an attack, they
observed that these information-theoretic properties, such as entropy, are likely to
change. However, this only holds true for CAN-bus injection attacks that deviate
from the normal behavior of the ECU. If the attacker is able to mount the attack
without changing the behavior of the CAN bus — such as through a bus-off attack
[19] or Bootrom attack [68] — it may not result in a significant change in the entropy
score and thereby evade detection. In contrast, CarSec does not model the CAN-
bus traffic. It externally validates the sensor values using their estimation based
on smartphone sensor readings. This makes it possible to detect sensor falsification
attacks even in the presence of no abnormal CAN-bus traffic.
Cho and Shin [20] used clock-based fingerprinting of ECUs to identify misbehaving
ECUs, which is orthogonal to CarSec. Once CarSec is used to determine that an
attack is taking place, we can use the system presented in [20] to pinpoint the culprit
ECU.
3.2.2.2 In-Vehicular Intrusion Detection Systems
Other IDSes model the normal behavior of the vehicle by comparing with other
vehicle sensors on the CAN bus. For example, Ganesan et al. [39] use cross-correlation
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to constrain the possible values of different ECUs within the CAN bus. Wasicek et
al. [107] use neural networks to model the relationship between engine RPM, torque
and speed. Cho et al. [21] used a random forest to model the brake behavior in
different road and weather conditions. All these approaches rely on sensors within
the CAN bus and may be susceptible to the same adversary who can inject data into
the CAN bus. In contrast, CarSec uses the smartphone sensors, which are an external
source of knowledge, to cross-validate the internal sensors within the vehicle. Even if
the vehicle has been compromised, this additional source of redundancy can provide
a measurement of true sensor values.
In addition to providing an external source of knowledge, smartphones are also
freely and readily available to enhance car security. Furthermore, they are personal
devices which form a natural interface to the user. If there is a problem with your car,
your phone can warn you and help you take preventative and diagnostic measures.
3.3 Background and Threat Model
Vehicles are built with many ECUs which are responsible for different vehicular
functions and usually communicate with each other using one or more Controller
Area Network (CAN) buses. These buses are broadcast-based and use a decentralized
protocol for access arbitration and real-time communication.
Sensor-falsification attacks use these communication networks to broadcast sen-
sor data masquerading as one of the ECUs. Since the CAN protocol does not iden-
tify/authenticate senders/receivers, an attacker capable of writing to CAN bus can
achieve this [57, 69, 68]. For example, an attacker can gain write access using an
Internet-facing Infotainment system, forced Bluetooth pairing or even a corrupted
audio file with a firmware update [14]. Once successful, the attacker can mount an
attack which involves writing falsified messages to the CAN bus. The intention of
this attack may be to confuse the user (e.g., [69] p.32, [57] p.456), or to control the
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Ref. ID Page # Target ECU Sensor spoofed Purpose of attack
1 32 Instrument Cluster (IC) Speed Confuse user
2 32 IC Engine RPM Confuse user
3 34 IC Odometer Confuse user
4 38 Pre-Collision System (PCS) RADAR-state Sudden brake, disable gas pedal
5 43 Intel. Park. Assistant System (IPAS) Gear, Speed Control steering
6 45 Lane Keeping Assistant (LKA) Camera-state Control steering
[69]
7 59 IC Fuel gauge Confuse user
8 455 IC Fuel gauge Confuse user
[57]
9 456 IC Speed Confuse user
10 84 IC Engine RPM Confuse user
[70]
11 85 Anti-lock Brake System (ABS) Imminent collision state Cause ABS to apply brakes
12 7 IC Speed Confuse user
13 23 Power Steer. Ctrl. Module (PSCM) Engine RPM Put ECU in diagnostic mode[68]
14 27 Park. Assistance Module (PAM) Speed Control steering
Table 3.1: Example CAN bus injection attacks which require falsifying vehicular
sensors.
vehicle (e.g., [68] p.27), as enumerated in Table 3.1 and categorized in Fig. 3.2.
3.3.1 Why Smartphones?
CarSec uses smartphone sensors for cross-validation of vehicle sensors. Smart-
phones are attractive to play this role for several reasons.
• They are powerful and capable computers with multiple ways to sense the out-
side environment. For example, the latest flagship phone from Samsung has a
2.7/1.8 Ghz 8-core processor and 11 sensors [58].
• They are ubiquitous and always-on-and-with-person. One study found that
77% of U.S. adults have smartphones [13]. Given their prevalence, smartphones
can act as a free source of data redundancy in our vehicular IDS.
• Smartphones undergo a frequent refresh rate and on average, users buy a new
smartphone every ≈2 years [56]. In a span of two years, phones often undergo
significant improvements in their resources including CPU, memory, OS, sen-
sors, etc. For example, the Galaxy S series significantly improved in processing
power (2.3 Ghz quad core in 2016 to 2.7/1.8 Ghz octa core in 2018) and software
(Android 6 in 2016 to Android 8 in 2018).
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3.3.2 Adversary Model
We model our adversary after what is normally found in related literature. At
the bare minimum, the adversary has write access to the CAN bus (e.g., through
the UConnect infotainment system, as demonstrated in [70]) and uses this access to
broadcast falsified sensor values. S/he uses falsified sensor readings to confuse the
user or force ECUs within the vehicle to misbehave. The attacks can vary in how
quickly they are accomplished and must be detected.
3.3.2.1 Trusted Components
In order to run CarSec, the driver must carry a smartphone equipped with IMU
and GPS sensors. We assume the smartphone is not compromised and is mounted on
the windshield or placed in the cup holder. Smartphone security is an active area of
research and there exist numerous deployed solutions to ensure that the software run-
ning on a smartphone has integrity and hasn’t been compromised. Besides, securing
smartphones is orthogonal to our work.
Additionally, the driver needs to connect an OBD dongle to the OBD-II port found
under the steering wheel. These are cheap and widely available devices used by many
people for diagnostic and telematics purposes. We assume that the OBD-dongle is not
compromised. We envision an OBD dongle which has very limited functionality and
only serves to dutifully relay the information it reads on the CAN bus. A simple OBD
dongle which only serves the purpose of relaying information doesn’t need Internet
connectivity and doesn’t need programmability. Although prior work has shown
remote compromise through the OBD dongle [37, 70], its target was dongles that
have Internet connectivity and sophisticated programmability. This sophistication
makes them vulnerable to attacks from the Internet.
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3.3.2.2 Attacks to Be Covered
CarSec detects sensor falsification attacks which are mounted via the CAN bus
that can be externally cross-validated using the smartphone sensors. Sensor falsifica-
tion on the CAN bus is often the first step in vehicular cyber-compromise reported in
literature [68, 69, 70, 57]. As such, it is important to detect and thwart the attacks
at this stage before they progress further.
We assume the sensor-spoofing happens through CAN-bus injection. In other
words, it doesn’t involve externally spoofing the sensor values via LiDAR injection or
other means. There are numerous examples of CAN-bus injection attacks reported in
literature. For example, [57] p.458 demonstrates a compound attack which involves
falsifying a speedometer reading and [69] p.43 presents a detailed attack that controls
the steering wheel angle by falsifying gear and vehicle speed readings.
3.3.2.3 Attacks Not to Be Covered
CarSec is not designed to detect CAN-injection attacks which do not involve sensor
falsification. For instance, CarSec cannot detect CAN-injections used to lock/unlock
the door found in [69] p.58. Additionally, CarSec is not designed to detect CAN-
injections where the spoofed sensor value reflects the actual vehicle sensor value. This
happens when the spoofed value is the same as the real value or when the vehicle
reacts to the spoofed value and changes its state to resemble the input value (e.g.,
[68] p.22).
3.4 System Model
We estimated six in-vehicle sensors using smartphone sensors. We chose to focus
on these 6 sensors for the following reasons. They are falsified in various attacks found











Figure 3.2: Sensor falsification attacks can be characterized in two axes:intention and
time sensitivity. The attack IDs are explained in Table 3.1.
dynamics, thereby making it possible to replicate and cross-validate them using the
external smartphone sensors. There are also increasing commercial interests in these
sensors, making them available to consumers.
These sensors and their estimation equations are summarized in Table 3.2a. For
some of them, we used estimated sensors as input to estimate additional sensors.
The dependency of sensor estimation is shown in Fig. 3.12a. CarSec cross-validates
these estimations with the sensor values reported via the CAN bus to confirm or
raise a warning about the reported values. We give the details of 5 sensors below.
The odometer can be accurately estimated by accumulating the Haversine distance
between consecutive GPS points.1
Some of these sensor estimations require per-vehicle calibration. For example, we
trained a different neural network for each vehicle in our dataset for Gear estimation,
and loaded vehicle-specific parameters for engine RPM or fuel MPG. These must be
done one time for each vehicle model and can be done by the OEM before release.
CarSec doesn’t require per-smartphone calibration. The same vehicle-model can be




IMU-align R = [(~V × ~G)T ; ~V T ; ~GT ]
Speed vt = α(vt−1 +AccY ∗ dt) + (1− α)GPSv
Gear Neural-network based on vehicle speed
Steering [64] k ∗ arcsin(l ∗ yawrate/v)
Eng. RPM [94] v ∗ (Fr ∗Gr)/T
Odometer Haversine sum of consecutive GPS
Fuel level Distance * Average MPG
(a) Estimation of 6 different sensors used in
CarSec. When an attack is detected, CarSec
compares the approximations with the values
on CAN. For details on each sensor, see their
respective sections below.
Speed Offset in Seconds
{-0.5, -0.4, -0.3, -0.2, -0.1, 0}
{-5, -0.5, -0.4, -0.3, -0.2, -0.1, 0}
{-1, 0}
{-3, -2, -1, 0}
{-4, -3, -2, -1, 0}
(b) Each feature vector represents
the vehicle’s speed sampled at differ-
ent time offsets in seconds. For each
vehicle, we searched through each of
these to find the most optimal one.
Table 3.2: Summary of estimation equations.
3.4.1 Speed
We fuse the speed estimates from both the accelerometer and GPS sensors using
a complementary filter. The integration of consecutive accelerometer readings is an
estimate of the speed, but due to the noise in the IMU sensor readings, this results in
very divergent and incorrect speed estimates. Alternatively, we use the GPS sensor
for speed estimates in the order of 1Hz, but it misses more frequent changes which
might be sensed by the IMU sampling at 10Hz.
To use the accelerometer, we first align the phone’s IMU accelerometer readings
to the vehicle’s direction of travel. Given consecutive GPS points, we find the angle
of the GPS bearing offset from the magnetic north. We then rotate the magnetic
north vector from the magnetometer by the same angle to get the vehicle pointing
vector from the phone’s frame of reference, called ~V . We do this using a change of
basis transformation from the plane perpendicular to the frame of reference which
has basis vectors ~M, ~G, ~G × ~M where ~M is the magnetic north. Using ~G and ~V we
54
can calculate the rotation matrix R, described in Eq. (3.1).








After calculating R, we rotate all accelerometer readings in the vehicle’s frame of
reference by ~Accv = R ~Accp
T
where ~Accv and ~Accp are the accelerometer vectors in
the vehicle and phone frame of reference, respectively.
As in [64], we also found that the GPS-estimated speed is slightly delayed from
the actual vehicle speed. We aligned the GPS-speed by shifting it by ≈0.5 seconds,
a value we found experimentally in our data. We fuse the Y axis of the aligned
Accv, and the delay-adjusted GPSspeed using a complementary filter vt = α(vt−1 +
Accv[Y ]dt) + (1 − α)GPSspeed. We set dt to 100 ms since our accelerometer sample
rate is 10Hz. We search through a training set and set α to 0.33.
3.4.2 Steering Wheel Angle
We estimate the steering wheel angle (SWA) using the yaw-rate of the gyroscope
on the phone. To accurately estimate the SWA, we first align the phone’s coordinate
system with the world coordinate system, and then convert the angular rotation in
the yaw axis to SWA. We use a similar rotation matrix as described in R above. Since
we are only concerned about the yaw-rate, this only uses the third row of the rotation
vector — which is the vector pointing in the direction of gravity. Only using the
gravity vector for world-frame alignment is more robust than using the vehicle-facing
vector and is sufficient for SWA calculations.
With this new rotation matrix R′, we calculate the aligned gyroscopic movement
55
in the world frame of reference by ~gw = R
′ ~gp
T where ~gw and ~gp are the gyroscope
vectors in the world and phone frame of reference, respectively.
Once we aligned to the world frame of reference, we use a simplified Ackerman
mechanism model to estimate the steering wheel angle using the smartphone’s IMU
sensors [64]. The steering wheel angle is estimated using:
θsteering = k ∗ arcsin(l ∗ yawrate/v), (3.2)
where k is the steering ratio, l is the vehicle length,2 v is the vehicle speed and yawrate
is the world-aligned yaw rate calculated using the above transformation.
3.4.3 Fuel Level
We estimate the vehicle’s fuel level by using the manufacturer’s published aver-
age MPG. Starting with a full tank of gas, CarSec uses the manufacturer-published
datasheet on the tank capacity of the vehicle. As the user drives his vehicle, CarSec
matches each location of the vehicle to a road segment3 and labels that as either
highway or city-level driving, using publicly available information, e.g., [35]. We take
the average MPG for that type of road and multiply it by the distance traveled to
get the new fuel tank level.
3.4.4 Gear Position
We focus on automatic transmission vehicles and exclude continuous variable
transmission systems. The gear position in automatic transmission vehicles is con-
trolled by the Transmission Control Unit (TCU). The TCU uses inputs from a variety
of vehicle sensors to inform its algorithm to upshift or downshift the gear. These sen-
sors include the vehicle speed, throttle position, and many others. Using a detailed
2We found both of these in vehicle specifications published online by the respective manufacturers.
3We matched it to OpenStreetMap [75].
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algorithm, the TCU adjusts the gear position to reduce load on the engine, increase
safety of the driver, and reduce the long-term wear and tear of internal components.
Since the smartphone lacks access to many of these sensor values, we trained
neural networks based on a vector of the vehicle’s recent speed to predict the current
gear position. For each vehicle, we found the most accurate feature vector from those
listed in Table 3.2b. We also searched through a neural network of depths 1, 2 or 3
where each layer is densely connected with 10 neurons each. The output is a one-hot
encoding of the current gear position. We used Tensorflow to train these models, and
Tensorflow Lite to run them on Android [1].
3.4.5 Engine RPM
The engine RPM is related to the vehicle speed and the current gear position via:
RPM = v ∗ (Fr ∗Gr)/T, (3.3)
where v is vehicle speed in meters per minute, Fr is the final drive ratio, Gr is the
transmission gear ratio and T is tire circumference in meters. We learned Fr, Gr and
T using publicly published parameters by the vehicle manufacturer [35]. We used the
gear estimate from our gear position estimation described above.
3.5 Evaluation
We first evaluated CarSec’s estimation accuracy for each of the 6 sensors (Sec. 3.5.2).
Next we evaluated CarSec’s sensor-falsification detection accuracy against common
falsification attacks found in the literature (Sec. 3.5.3). Finally, we implemented
CarSec in Android and measured the computation resource usage and latency of
each component (Sec. 3.5.4).
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Vehicle model Trips Hours
Mid-size sedan 2018 21 7.08
SUV A 2017 12 4.87
Compact sedan A 2017 2 0.91
SUV B 2016 44 9.73
Hatchback 2016 2 0.73
Compact sedan B 2012 31 5.07
Total 112 28.56
Table 3.3: Driving dataset collected for evaluation of CarSec. We use the OpenXC
[36] platform to access the CAN bus data in all test vehicles. We collected a total of
712.8 miles of data.
3.5.1 Evaluation Dataset
We evaluated CarSec by driving around and collecting ground truth data from
the CAN bus and smartphone sensors. Our evaluation required in-vehicle data that
is beyond the scope of the OBD-II diagnostic standard, so we used OpenXC [36] to
collect data from test cars. We collected data from 112 trips for a total of 28.56
hours and 712.8 miles of driving. The trips covered highways and surface streets. We
collected data from 7 different Ford vehicles and 3 drivers, summarized in Table 3.3.
The drivers were asked to place the phone in a natural stationary location such as
the windshield, cup holder or their pocket. More diverse phone placements while the
phone is used by the passenger is shown in Sec. 3.5.2.7.
In the following evaluation, we estimate the in-vehicle sensors (speed, steering
wheel angle, gear, engine RPM, odometer, and fuel level) using smartphone sensors
(GPS, IMU, magnetometer). See Sec. 3.4 for details of the estimation algorithms.
3.5.2 Estimation Accuracy
We evaluated CarSec’s estimation accuracy in the absence of attacks. We compare
the estimated and the ground truth values for all 112 trips. Fig. 3.3 plots the CDF of
the errors. The results presented in this section corroborate the estimation accuracy
reported by prior work [94, 64]. We go beyond prior work in our gear estimation
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(f) Steering wheel angle:
{50th, 95th}={2.02,
38.2}◦
Figure 3.3: Estimation error of vehicular sensors using CarSec. Each CDF shows the
estimation error of each trip along with the average error in a thick black line.
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evaluation and dig deeper into the common cause of estimation failure for many
sensors. Moreover we evaluate the estimation algorithms under normal phone usage
scenarios.
3.5.2.1 Speed
CarSec can very accurately estimate the speed using GPS sensors — 50th per-
centile has < 0.69kmph error, and 95th percentile has < 4.74kmph error. The low-
frequency speed (< 1Hz) is accurately estimated using the GPS-inferred speed and the
high-frequency speed (> 1Hz) is estimated using the aligned accelerometer readings.
3.5.2.2 Gear
CarSec also accurately estimates the gear position. Over ≈80% of the time, it
can exactly estimate the current gear position, and at 95% percentile, it is wrong by
1 gear position. We observed that the errors are related to where the driver travels.
CarSec can more accurately estimate the gear position when the trip is predominantly
in the highway versus surface local roads (see Figs. 3.6a and 3.6b). We divided the
data from the highway and the local road by map-matching the GPS points to the
OpenStreetMap database. This effect occurs because the driver tends to stay in the
same gear in the highway whereas there is much more fluctuation caused by start and
stop behavior on the surface streets. This is further corroborated by the fact that
gear estimation error and vehicle speed have a negative pairwise correlation of -0.1,
meaning as the vehicle goes faster, there is less gear estimation error.
3.5.2.3 Odometer, Fuel-Level
CarSec can also accurately estimate odometer (50th% < 0.15km, 95% < 2.14km)
and fuel level (50th% < 0.09L, 95% < 0.51L). Due to the accumulative nature of
fuel estimation, we noticed an increasing error as the trip continues for a longer
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period of time. The fuel-level estimate and drifting error are shown in Fig. 3.8. The
accumulating error only affects the estimates within a single trip. In between trips,
CarSec estimates the change in odometer and fuel level, and is therefore able to detect
injection attacks which happen during the trip.
3.5.2.4 Steering Wheel Angle
CarSec can estimate steering wheel angle with < 2.02◦ error in 50% of all trips, and
< 38.2◦ in 95% of all trips. We found a strong negative correlation between steering
wheel angle estimation and vehicle speed (coef=-0.22) and gear position (coef=-0.31).
We found large errors in steering wheel angle when the car moves slowly. This occurs
because as the car drives faster, there is a stronger relationship between the induced
yaw rate in the vehicle body and the steering wheel angle.
3.5.2.5 Engine RPM
CarSec has the most challenge in estimating the engine RPM. The 50% error is
115.6 RPM and 95% error is 788.5 RPM. We use the estimated vehicle speed and
vehicle gear position to calculate the likely RPM value (equation shown in Table 3.2a).
Even if we use the ground truth vehicle speed and gear position, there is a large
variability in the calculated RPM, as shown in Fig. 3.7a.
This large variation in the engine RPM estimation is caused by tire slip. The
relationship between the engine RPM and tire speed is mediated by the tire slip ratio
[21]. The tire slip is affected by such factors as the road conditions, wear of the tire,
and the friction coefficient between the tire and the road. To uncover this relationship,
we separated the regions with high acceleration of the vehicle, where there is likely to
be high tire slip as the vehicle moves faster, from regions with low acceleration. This
difference in the estimation error between the two scenarios is shown in Fig. 3.7b.
We found +524 more RPM error (a 1790% increase) for sudden acceleration versus
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normal acceleration conditions. Similarly, we found 372% increased error in up-hill





































































































































































































Figure 3.4: Estimation error using the passenger’s phone. The black horizontal line
shows the 50th and 95th percentile errors for each of these sensors when the phone is
more carefully mounted, as done in our previous experiments.
3.5.2.6 GPS blockage noise
CarSec relies on GPS to estimate the vehicle speed. We evaluated the effect of
GPS error/noise by adding artificial noise to the dataset before estimating the vehicle
speed. The results are plotted in Fig. 3.5.
We added normally-distributed noise to the GPS samples (sampled up to once
every 100ms). We injected random noise for each 100ms time sample of the GPS
signal. Realistic GPS noise is likely to be less jittery and noisy, but our analysis
shows the effect of a more extreme noise distribution. We found that as we increase
the high-frequency GPS noise, the average error also increases. The trend is that for
every additional meter of high-frequency GPS noise, we see an additional error of 1
km/h speed estimation on average. Furthermore, we found that with an increased
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Figure 3.5: Vehicle speed estimation error for increasing high-frequency GPS noise.
For higher GPS noise, CarSec relies more and more on the accelerometer component
of the complementary filter.
GPS noise, CarSec also relied more on the vehicle-aligned accelerometer. This is
shown as the α curve in our analysis results. α refers to the trade-off between GPS-
speed and accelerometer-speed, used in the complementary filter in CarSec. To extend
this work, we can use the GPS confidence returned by GPS chips to conditionally
turn on or off CarSec’s estimation capabilities.
3.5.2.7 Additional Redundancy from Passengers’ Phones
CarSec can be easily extended to make use of additional sources of redundancy
from other devices. We demonstrate this possibility by running CarSec on passengers’
smartphones while they engage in various common activities on their phone. We
recruited 7 different passengers to repeat a 6.7 mile-long circuit four times. Each trip
around the circuit, the passenger engaged in one of the following four activities —
watching a movie, browsing a website, typing out a message, or making a phone call.
For each condition we collected ≈2 hours and 50 miles of data. In total we collected
7.9 hours and 200 miles of data.
The 50th and 95th percentile estimation errors are shown in Fig. 3.4. We skipped
odometer and fuel since those only depend on the GPS, which is unaffected by who
is using the phone. We also skipped gear estimation results since they are the same
as the 50th and 95th percentile estimation accuracy presented earlier in this section.
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Across all sensors, the estimation accuracy is only minimally affected by the pas-
senger using the phone. There are two main factors which affect the estimation
accuracy while the passenger uses the phone.
The first factor is how much the user interacts with the phone. We found that
as the user types on the phone or makes a phone call, the steering wheel estimation
accuracy tends to be worse. Especially when the passenger types on the phone, the
95th percentile steering wheel estimation error is worse compared to other activities.
The steering wheel estimation heavily makes use of the IMU sensors to both align
to the world-frame and convert the gyroscope readings to steering wheel estimates.
Increased noise in the IMU readings results in worse estimations. Speed is also affected
by typing (95th percentile texting is worse than browsing) but this is overshadowed
by a second factor.
The second factor is the phone orientation. When the passenger watches a movie
(in landscape orientation) or places a phone call, the phone is no longer oriented
in the direction of the car’s travel. For both browsing and texting, the phone is in
portrait orientation and faces the direction of the car’s travel. Since speed estimation
uses the accelerometer in the direction of the car’s travel, this is more sensitive to the
phone orientation.
The second factor doesn’t affect steering wheel estimations as badly because the
phone only needs to the re-oriented to the world-plane to get the angular movement.
We simply do this using the gravity vector. In contrast, the speed estimation requires
that we get the oriented acceleration along the axis of the car’s movement, which is
a more constrained estimation of the phone’s orientation.


























(a) Local road gear error
























(b) Highway gear error






























(a) Engine RPM estimation error us-
ing the ground truth vehicle speed
and gear position.


























(b) Distribution of RPM errors. Fig-
ure best seen in color.
Figure 3.7: Engine RPM and tire slip investigation
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Figure 3.8: Fuel estimation error drift
3.5.2.8 Key Findings
We corroborated the errors reported in prior work in estimating vehicle sensors
[64, 21]. We also made three key findings, summarized below.
• Phone-based estimation algorithms work reliably even while the phone is being
used for common activities such as texting or making a phone call.
• Gear position can be accurately estimated using a neural network that accepts
the recent change in vehicle speed.
• By conditioning for various factors, we discovered that engine RPM estimation
is plagued by tire slip. This is especially predominant in steep road segments
or regions with high-acceleration applied to the car.
3.5.3 Sensor-Falsification Detection Accuracy
Next, we use the best settings learned from the estimation accuracy evaluation
(Sec. 3.5.2) to evaluate the of sensor-falsification detection accuracy. This evaluation
first involves injecting data into the CAN bus to mimic realistic attacks (Sec. 3.5.3.1)
and then detecting intrusion using CarSec (Sec. 3.5.3.3).
66
3.5.3.1 CAN-bus Injection
We injected data into the collected data traces to simulate sudden, gradual, and
delta injections. The attacker might resort to one of these three forms of injection
depending on the intended outcome. For example, in [68] p.23, an attacker spoofs
false RPM values to put an ECU into diagnostic mode. In this case, the purpose
of the attack is to quickly put the vehicle in diagnostic mode, so the attacker would
flood the CAN bus with the target RPM value, a sudden injection. Alternatively, in
[69] p.38 or [57] p.458, the attacker gradually changes the falsified values to control
the vehicle or stealthily confuse the user, a gradual injection. An attacker might also
falsify values that are consistently different from the current value so as to mimic
normal but incorrect behavior. For example, in [57] p.458, the attacker falsified the
speedometer value to be 10mph below the actual speed of the car, a delta injection.
Table 3.4 details the injection types, sensors, and values.
Sensor Values Rationale
Speed { 4, 10, 25, 50, 100 } kmph Used in manipulating other ECUs E.g. [69].
Steer. Wheel Angle { -100, -50, -10, 10, 50, 100 } degrees Trick adaptive headlight into shining in the wrong location.
Gear { -1, 1, 4, 6 } gear Used in manipulating other ECUs, e.g., [69].












Fuel level { 15.4 } gallons Trick driver into emptying gas tank, e.g., [57].
Speed { -50, -10, +10 } kmph Trick driver into going faster. E.g., [57].
Steer. Wheel Angle { +10, +50 } degrees




Fuel Level { +0.5 } gallons Trick driver into driving without sufficient fuel level, e.g., [57]
Table 3.4: Specific injection values used in our analysis. The first five attacks were
injected as a sudden or gradual injection. The last four were injected immediately as
a delta of the actual value. See Sec. 3.5.3.1 for more details. These injection values
were inspired by existing literature and extend beyond them.
In all three cases of injection, we measured the difference between smartphone-
estimated value and CAN-bus reported value, and counted the instances of true pos-
itive (TP), true negative (TN), false positive (FP) and false negative (FN). We used
the normal case without injection to count FP and TN, and the injected case to
count TP and FN. In what follows, we compare the True Positive Rate (TPR) and































(a) Sudden attack where the
attacker immediately sets the































(b) Gradual attack where
the sensor value gradually
changes to the target over a
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tacker sets the injected value
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Figure 3.9: The true positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) of different
conditions. We considered gradual, sudden, and delta injections. See Sec. 3.5.3.1 for
more details. For each condition, we restricted the maximum FPR and adjusted the
parameters to yield the highest TPR. As we reduced the FPR requirement, the TPR
also suffered.
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defined as TP/(TP + FN) and the FPR is defined as FP/(FP + TN). Configuring
CarSec results in a tradeoff between TPR and FPR. A cautious driver would prefer
to increase TPR at the risk of more alarms. However, if the FPR is too high, it will
raise too many false alarms and might lead to the driver ignoring the alarms during
a real attack.
3.5.3.2 Warning Threshold
CarSec uses two parameters before flagging an on-going attack — the attack mag-
nitude and duration. By adjusting these parameters, CarSec can be configured to
trade off false positive rates (FPR) with true positive rates (TPR). The first param-
eter specifies a threshold difference between the estimated CarSec and OBD values
before flagging it as anomalous. This can be caused by an attack, by a faulty sensor,
or by estimation inaccuracy due to inaccurate smartphone sensors. The second pa-
rameter disambiguates this by looking for a sustained deviation from expected values.
The first parameter is in a different unit for each sensor. For example, the steering
wheel angle sensor uses “degrees.” The second parameter is in seconds.
We search through 100 combinations of both parameters and calculate the receiver
operating characteristic (ROC) curve. We set the magnitude threshold to one of
10 different values, defined independently for each sensor, and set the duration
threshold to one of 10 different values equally ranging from 100ms to 5s. Fig. 3.10 is
the ROC curve for speed-falsification detection. With the ROC curve, we search for
the configuration which yields the maximum TPR for bounded FPR values, where
FPR is bounded to {0.1, 0.5, 0.01, 0.001}
3.5.3.3 Detection Accuracy
Fig. 3.9 shows the FPR and TPR for different attacks, and detection thresholds.
CarSec is able to most accurately detect attacks which falsify speed, fuel level or
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Figure 3.10: ROC curve of 100 different combinations of the two parameters — attack
magnitude and duration. For each combination, we calculate the FPR and TPR. A
similar ROC curve was computed for each of the 6 sensor estimations.
odometer values.
Speed For sudden falsification attack, CarSec can detect speed injection attacks
with TPR=97.33%, FPR=0.2% and for a delta attack, CarSec can detect the injec-
tion with TPR=99.67% and FPR=0.2%. However, if the attacker gradually spoofs
speed values to the desired target value, CarSec’s accuracy drops to TPR=90.25%
at FPR=0.2%. If the user is willing to tolerate more false alarms, CarSec can detect
gradual speed spoofing attacks at TPR=94.98% at FPR=4.56%.
Fuel-level We found a similar pattern in the fuel-level attacks. CarSec can de-
tect a fuel-level delta attack at TPR=93.86% at FPR=0.77%, and a sudden attack
at TPR=88.8% at FPR=0.77%. However, it only detects the gradual attack at
TPR=64.57% at FPR=0.77%. In the subsequent analysis, we uncovered the rea-
son for poorer performance in detecting gradual-level attacks. In a gradual attack,
injected values closely resembles the actual values during initial stages of the attack.
Only after a few seconds of the 10-second gradual attack does the value start to dif-
fer. We decouple this factor and study the detection accuracy by the percentage of
injection in Sec. 3.5.3.4.
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Steering Wheel Angle CarSec is able to detect delta steering wheel injection
attacks at TPR=91.98% for FPR=0%, sudden-injection attacks at TPR=94.12%
for FPR=0%, and gradual-injection attacks at TPR=58.33% for FPR=0%. The
steering-wheel detection is less accurate for gradual injection attacks due to the in-
herent difficulty of estimating the steering wheel angle using IMU sensors. This is
especially a problem when the vehicle is traveling very slowly or stopped at a stop
sign. The driver may move the steering wheel significantly but the IMU sensor will
be unable to estimate these values. Therefore, in order to improve the TPR, we have
to accommodate a much higher FPR, which may not be acceptable for drivers.
Gear Position CarSec can accurately detect any gear injection attacks
— TPR=90.08%, FPR=0.22% for sudden injection and TPR=88.3%, FPR=4.79%
for gradual injection. Contrary to other sensors, even a gradual gear injection can
be detected with high accuracy because of the discrete nature of gear values. The
smallest injection can change the gear value by 1 gear position. As seen in Fig. 3.3,
we can estimate the gear position correctly almost 80% of the time.
Engine RPM Mirroring what we saw in the estimation accuracy, CarSec has the
most difficulty in detecting RPM injection attacks. Sudden attacks have TPR=78.29%,
FPR=0.54% and gradual attacks have TPR=43.22%, FPR=0.54%. This resembles
our estimation error which is caused by tire slip, as shown in Fig. 3.7b. In the ideal
case, the RPM estimation without considering tire slip is still incorrect by just over
1000 RPM values in the 99th percentile. If we only look at injection between 1000–
1200 RPM values, we can detect them with 87.23% TPR. We further investigate the
relationship between attack magnitude and detection rate in the next section.
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3.5.3.4 Smallest Detectable Attack
We measured the minimum injection that CarSec can detect. This analysis helps
us disentangle the type of injection from our detection method. Fig. 3.11 shows the
result of this analysis.
-10 -9 -8 -7 -6 -5 -4 -3 -2 -1 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10










1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20















Fuel level (Unit=0.3 L)
Figure 3.11: The left figure shows TPR for varying amounts of injection magnitude.
The right figure shows varying fixed values of injection. At the moment of the injection
the vehicle sensor varies depending on the scenario. For instance, in some cases the
car was traveling at 10 kmph when there was a 4kmph injection. For all cases, FPR
was less than 5% and therefore omitted. Figure best seen in color.
As shown in Fig. 3.11, we injected different magnitude values for each sensor
deviating from the actual value. The X-axis is the magnitude of the injection where
each unit is multiplied by the scale specific to that sensor, shown in the figure legend.
We can detect speed injection once it exceeds 10kmph. Similarly, the minimum bound
threshold for other sensors are: engine RPM=1000 RPM, Gear=2, steering=22.5◦,
odometer=4km and fuel level=0.9L.
On the left figure, we show varying magnitudes of a delta injection. As the injection
is close to 0 delta (i.e. the true value), the TPR drops to 0. On the right figure, we
show the TPR for fixed injection values. If the fixed value is close to the actual value
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(a) The architecture of our CarSec implemen-
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(b) Average % CPU utilized for each
individual component of CarSec and
the combined operation of CarSec.
Figure 3.12: Implementation details and measurements
3.5.3.5 Key Findings
The key results of intrusion detection accuracy evaluation can be summarized
as follows. These findings are key contributions of our work, which is the first to
investigate using phone sensors to detect CAN-bus injection attacks.
• Mirroring what we found in estimation evaluation (Section 3.5.2), CarSec can
detect injection to the vehicle speed, fuel level, steering wheel angle, gear and
odometer with high true positive rate (TPR), but has a lower TPR for engine
RPM.
• The TPR depends on the nature of the attack. It is lowest during a gradual
attack - this is due to injections of very low magnitude at the onset of the attack.
• The TPR increases as the attack magnitude increases and starts to starts to
exceed the estimation error.
3.5.4 Android Implementation and Evaluation
We implemented CarSec as an Android app for all devices running Android 7.0
or higher. CarSec reads vehicular data via a Bluetooth-based dongle attached to
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the vehicle’s OBD port. It uses the internal phone-based sensors to estimate the
same sensors from the OBD dongle, and reports any suspicious looking discrepancies
to the user. CarSec infrequently polls nearby Bluetooth devices to detect if it is
within proximity of the vehicle. Once it detects that the user is near their vehicle, it
establishes a connection, and starts security-assistance operations.
The Bluetooth latency incurred by CarSec communicating the information from
the OBD dongle to the phone is negligible (due to short distance and low traffic)
and all data are aligned to the same time using timestamps. Furthermore, as we
show below, the time to run each estimation algorithm is also within the order of
milliseconds, making CarSec a very time-efficient implementation.
We implemented each of the six sensor estimators into CarSec in a modular
fashion. Each module has a set of inputs which it uses to calculate the estimated
value. The inputs can be raw phone sensors or outputs from other module estima-
tors. Fig. 3.12a shows the relationship between the input and output of each module.
Each module’s outputs are routed to other modules which depend on them. This
modular implementation pattern avoids replicated code and operations within the
resource-constrained phone. We built each module on top of a vehicular data col-
lection library developed in our lab. The library handles interfacing with Android
sensors, with Bluetooth-based OBD dongle, routing data from one module to an-
other, and many other basic requirements of CarSec. Each sensor estimation logic
took less than 100 lines of Java code to implement. The vehicle alignment and gear
estimation modules took the most amount of development effort due to their increased
complexity.
We measured the CPU usage of each of the estimators within CarSec and the
combined operation of CarSec. The results are shown in Fig. 3.12b. We separated
out the six estimation algorithms within CarSec and evaluated their CPU usage in
isolation, shown in the first six bars of the figure. These algorithms were tested
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using trace of the sensor data, in order to measure CPU usage isolated from data
collection. We also measured the CPU usage of data collection as a separate trial
shown in the bar titled “Read Phone Sensors”, and the full CarSec implementation
with all estimators and data collection, shown in the bar titled “Full CarSec”. All our
measurements were made on a Google Pixel 2, which has an Octa-core ARM-based
Kyro CPU.
For each test case, we ran that subset of CarSec for 1 minute and sampled the
percent CPU utilized using ‘top’. We divided this value by the number of cores — 8
cores in our test device. We also measured the CPU utilized by two system-level hard-
ware access services (grouped under “Hardware services”) and two system services
responsible for other operation within Android (grouped under “System services”).
As shown in Fig. 3.12b, CarSec only uses approximately 2% of the total CPU
availability for each of the sensor estimators. Furthermore, when we ran all sensors
simultaneously (shown under “All Estimators”), the CPU utilization is still near 2%.
The primary overhead of running CarSec is not the sensor estimation algorithms;
their implementation is very light-weight and make use of the output from each other
to reduce total CPU consumption. The primary overhead comes from other Android-
related requirements of launching an app.
Next we measured the cost of reading from the smartphone sensors (i.e., GPS,
IMU and magnetometer) without doing any sensor estimation. That is shown in the
bar labeled “Read Phone Sensors”. The CarSec process only takes approximately 1%
of the CPU, but the system-wide services which are used to read from the sensors
take approximately 6%, putting the total at around 7% CPU utilization. Finally, we
ran the full CarSec implementation with a user interface and it takes approximately
8% of the total CPU utilization.
We expect the driver to connect their phone to the car power source, as is com-
monly the case. A security-conscious driver may be willing to make this tradeoff to
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avoid any battery consumption by CarSec.
Each of the six modules which estimate six sensors run in negligible time. We
measured this by running CarSec and measuring the time required to process and
output each of the estimations. We averaged the runtime over approximately 100
runs of each estimator. Speed, steering wheel, fuel, and engine RPM modules all ran
in less than 1 ms on average. Odometer estimation ran in 2 ms on average and gear
estimator took 5.6 ms on average. The gear module is the most complex as it uses
a neural network to predict the gear position, and hence it takes the longest amount
of time. Since each estimation is very fast, the real bottleneck is the rate at which
the phone provides us with the low-level sensor values. For example, the odometer
estimation module depends on the GPS, which is often only available at 1Hz.
3.6 Discussion
CarSec brings car-security to everyday drivers. Due to ease of deployability and
the widespread, ubiquitous nature of smartphones, our system has the potential for
a wide reach.. Discussed below are a couple of remaining issues worth further inves-
tigation beyond our current approach.
• Compromised Phone Sensors. As described in our adversary model (Sec. 3.3.2),
we assume that the phone isn’t compromised. Mobile security is an active re-
search area on its own and is orthogonal to our work. We refer the reader to
recent surveys on mobile security [34].
• Additional Redundancy. We demonstrated that CarSec can run on passen-
gers’ phones while they engage in common activities on their phones. Similarly,
we can extend this work to other devices which have the required three sensors.
CarSec only needs IMU, magnetometer, and GPS sensors to estimate vehic-
ular sensors. Many existing IoT devices could be used in this way including
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smartwatches, fitness trackers, or some mounted after-market devices such as
Amazon Echo Auto, 4 as long as they expose access to these three sensors. We
leave the evaluation of this extension as future work.
• Response After Detection. CarSec serves as a two-factor source of knowl-
edge to detect sensor falsification attacks. If an attack is detected, CarSec
merely notifies the driver of the suspicious activity and they can choose to take
the car to a mechanic for further diagnostics. We do not consider automated
response based on this information. Automatically responding is risky since the
attacker may target the smartphone in order to trigger this response mechanism
and immobilize the car. Therefore, we restrict CarSec to detection and leave
response up to the driver.
3.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented CarSec, a car-security assistant which uses smart-
phone sensors to cross-validate and detect vehicular sensor falsification attacks. We
used smartphone sensors to estimate six sensors inside the vehicle: speed, fuel level,
odometer, engine RPM, gear position and steering wheel angle. Using driving traces
and simulated injections, we have demonstrated CarSec’s ability to detect injections
which have sufficient magnitude of attack (e.g., enough to actually impact the car or
confuse driver) very quickly after the attack onset.
We focused on these six sensors, but CarSec can easily be extended to many
more sensors within the vehicle. Furthermore, through the combination of multiple
phones, other IoT devices, and rich media sensors on the phone (e.g., cameras and
microphones), we can extend the space of sensors which can be cross-validated using
CarSec. This work lays the groundwork for future researchers to expand on the idea
4https://www.amazon.com/Introducing-Echo-Auto-first-your/dp/B0753K4CWG
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of using smartphones for car-security assistance.
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CHAPTER IV
Ubi: Using GPS Trajectories to Detect Driving
Hazards
4.1 Introduction
According to the World Health Organization (WHO), road injuries are one of the
leading causes of deaths worldwide in 2018 [76]. The National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (NHTSA) reported that in 2017, dangerous driving alone claimed
over 3000 lives [74]. To reduce this fatality, dangerous driving hazards — including
potholes, debris, pedestrians or other reckless drivers — must be detected and dealt
with in a timely manner.
4.1.1 State-of-the-Art
Automatic detection of road hazards is reserved for high-end vehicles with sophis-
ticated sensors and significant computing power. The majority of drivers without this
capability rely on phone-based solutions to be warned of upcoming hazards. Station-
ary hazards such as potholes or speed traps are collected and shared through popular
navigation applications such as Google Maps [66], but these solutions fail to track
moving hazards such as pedestrians or bicyclists. Furthermore, none of these ap-
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Figure 4.1: Ubi detects different driving hazards (shown in red) by collecting GPS
trajectories of vehicles around the hazard (shown in blue). This operation is done in
a cloud service and broadcast back to the drivers, or to the proper authorities
driver. The state-of-the-art in detecting reckless driving behavior requires collecting
GPS or sensor data from the driver in question [117, 111]. This approach is insuf-
ficient for an uncooperative reckless driver who wishes to hide his driving behavior
from the authorities. Thus, we need a solution to detect and track stationary and
mobile driving hazards without their explicit cooperation.
In this chapter, we provide a unified solution for detecting stationary (e.g., pot-
hole), slow (e.g., pedestrian) and fast (e.g., driver) moving hazards. Our solution, Ubi,
does not require data from the hazard in question and infers the presence through
GPS trajectories of, and sightings reported by well-behaving drivers surrounding the
hazard.
4.1.2 Proposed Solution
We propose a system called Ubi that detects stationary (e.g., potholes, broken-
down cars, or fallen tree branches), slow-moving (e.g., pedestrians) and fast-moving
(e.g., bicyclists, reckless driver) hazards. Our system, summarized in Fig. 4.1, accepts
the GPS trajectories of drivers on the road and any reported sightings of the hazard.
Using an internal graph representation of the road segment, Ubi identifies the most
likely hazard on the road segment, if any, and predicts their location into the future.
As new cars approach the hazard’s predicted location, Ubi sends a warning to the
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driver ahead of time.
4.1.3 Ubi Operation
Drivers install Ubi on their smartphone along with their regular navigation app.
During their daily commute, as they approach a hazard Ubi sends them an alert with
the type of hazard (e.g., pedestrian) and the current distance from the car. A driver
may also press a button on their smartphone to instruct Ubi about the presence of a
new hazard nearby. On the server side, the cloud operator collects GPS samples from
multiple drivers at the same location and tracks the reported sightings of hazards.
The server cycles through a library of known hazard types and identifies the most
likely hazard that fits the observed sightings. As a driver queries Ubi at time t, the
cloud operator predicts the location of the hazard at t and warns the driver if they
are nearby.
4.1.4 Key Technical Details
Ubi detects and tracks mobile hazards using two key ideas.
1. Mobility model Ubi uses an internal representation of the mobility patterns of
each hazard type. A mobility model is the probability distribution of movement
over each time step. For example, a pedestrian may only travel at a maximum
of 10m per second whereas a driver can travel much faster.
2. Graph representation Ubi combines the GPS trajectories, sightings of haz-
ards, and the mobility model of each hazard using a 3-dimensional occupancy
graph (Fig. 4.6). As hazards are sighted, Ubi marks individual nodes at that
time and attempts to find the best hazard that matches the sightings. For each
time step, Ubi applies the mobility model for each hazard type to predict how
the hazard could have moved from one time step to the next. This prediction
is then used to warn future drivers as they approach the hazard.
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4.1.5 Results
We use Ubi to detect three different hazards in simulation: a stationary pothole,
a slow-moving pedestrian, and a fast-moving bicyclist. We demonstrate that in all
three cases, Ubi is able to accurately classify the hazard type (≈ 95% accuracy) and
provide accurate warnings about the hazard’s distance from the driver (1.75m for
pothole, 1.5m for pedestrian and 3.5m for bicyclist). We demonstrated that Ubi is
resilient to GPS noise as high as 25m, which is the worst-case scenario in highly-dense
neighborhoods [52]. Furthermore, we show that the distance error decreases as the
density of cars increases.
4.1.6 Contributions
This chapter makes the following contributions:
1. Development of Ubi, a novel hazard detection and warning system that uses
GPS trajectories of nearby cars to detect stationary and mobile hazards;
2. A novel graph-based algorithm to track and predict the future locations of
mobile hazards;
3. Demonstration of Ubi’s effectiveness in detecting stationary potholes, slow-
moving pedestrians, and fast-moving bicyclists.
4.1.7 Outline
This chapter is organized as follows. We give Ubi’s algorithm and implementation
details in Sec. 4.3. In Sec. 4.4 we present the results of evaluating Ubi. Finally, we




There have been numerous methods proposed thus far to detect stationary, slow-
and fast-moving hazards. However, most of them require direct sensing of the hazard
(Sec. 4.2.1). A few of them also detect stationary hazards through indirect sensing of
GPS trajectories (Sec. 4.2.2).
4.2.1 Direct: Hazard Detection
Using cameras Most driving hazard detection systems use cameras and other sen-
sors to directly sense the hazard. For example, numerous systems use camera to
detect pedestrians [26] or other vehicles [93]. Autonomous vehicles use even more
advanced vision sensors to detect hazards in their surroundings [59]. Vision-based
systems require advanced processing and installation, which can be expensive in ex-
isting vehicles. Our solution simply uses GPS trajectories which is already widely
used in navigation systems.
Road anomaly detection Some systems use GPS and IMU sensors to detect sta-
tionary hazards, such as potholes or speed bumps [92, 91, 32, 7, 50]. They collect
IMU/GPS data from multiple vehicles driving by the stationary hazard and use ma-
chine learning techniques to identify the location of the hazard. With a notable
exception explored later [91], these systems only work if the vehicle drives over the
hazardous region. If the vehicle swerves out of the way, it will not register as anoma-
lous IMU sensor data. Furthermore, these systems are only able to detect stationary
hazards. In contrast, Ubi uses only GPS trajectories to detect stationary, slow- or
fast-moving hazards.
Detection of reckless drivers There have been numerous proposals for dangerous
driving detection. Many of them rely on data from inside the vehicle [45, 67, 117,
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104, 116, 107], smartphone data [113, 60, 61, 45, 18], camera data [112, 96, 53, 104,
61], or GPS trajectories [115, 111, 47, 2, 78]. All of these assume that the collected
dataset also includes data from the dangerous driver. In reality, however, this may
be missing due to lack of coverage or the active evasion by the dangerous driver. Ubi
assumes no data from the dangerous driver and uses the behavior of nearby vehicles
to reconstruct the likely trajectory and presence of the dangerous driver.
4.2.2 Indirect: Detection based on GPS trajectories
There are some solutions which infer the presence of other objects based on GPS
trajectory data. The authors of [90] use swerving behavior to detect the presence of
potholes. They observe that drivers tend to avoid potholes, and by aggregating the
driving behavior from multiple drivers, it is possible to reconstruct the likely location
of potholes. The authors of [47, 12] use GPS trajectories to infer the presence of
stop signs and stop lights. They observe that near stop signs, drivers will have a
sudden de-acceleration behavior, which can be aggregated in a large scale. [106] uses
GPS traces and map matching algorithms to find new road segments which are not
cataloged in a digital map. [23] uses common parking patterns in a busy street to
automatically infer parallel parking spots. The occupancy of a parking spot changes
over time, and during dense times, they use the fact that drivers drive past illegal
parking spots to infer that it must be illegal to park there.
All of these approaches use the GPS trajectories to find stationary hazards and
landmarks, such as potholes or stop signs. In contrast, Ubi goes beyond to slow- and
fast-moving hazards as well.
4.2.3 Graph-based anomaly detection
A few approaches use graph theory to detect abnormal driving behavior. [78]
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Figure 4.2: Ubi system components. Individual drivers upload their current location
and optionally a sighting of the hazard if they are nearby. Ubi uses subsequent sight-
ings to track the location of the hazard, and returns the distance from the upcoming
hazard.
and destination. If the flow of traffic through the graph changes significantly one
day, they investigate more closely to find the source of the change and find traffic
obstructions. Unlike this, we model the micro-traffic using graphs. The nodes in
our graph model is the open space and edges represent feasible movement of hazards
through the nodes.
[116] uses graphs to represent the state of the vehicle using multiple vehicular
sensors such as engine RPM, speed, gear and swerving behavior. Our work uses
graph models for an entirely different purpose of finding open spaces and feasible
trajectories.
4.2.4 Crowd-sourced detection
Existing navigation applications like Google Maps or Waze use crowd-sourced
reports to detect stationary obstacles or events on the road, such as a speed trap or
stopped car. These rely on manual user inputs and only work for stationary hazards.
Our system has the ability to expand the detection repertoire of these navigation
systems by also tracking and detecting mobile hazards, such as a pedestrian or a
reckless driver.
85
def warn_driver (time, gps, sighting):
all_gps.append(gps)
# Sighting reported, update hazard model
if sighting is not None:
all_sightings.append(sighting)
likelihood = {}
for hazard in all_hazard_types:
likelihood[hazard] = graph_search(
all_gps, all_sightings, hazard, time)
likely_hazard = most_likely_hazard(likelihood)
# No sighting reported
# Simulate past sighting of hazard and warn driver
else:
network = graph_search(
all_gps, all_sightings, likely_hazard, time)
location = average_location(network, time)
return likely_hazard, location
Figure 4.3: Ubi pseudocode. Ubi accepts a timestamped GPS location and whether
the hazard/obstacle was sighted at this location. If there is a sighting, it updates
the likelihood model. Otherwise, it predicts the current location of the obstacle and
warns the driver. The graph search algorithm is described in more detail in Alg. 4.4.
4.3 System Design
Ubi is a real-time detection and warning service for upcoming stationary or mobile
hazards. As shown in Fig. 4.2, Ubi accepts GPS trajectories from multiple drivers
near the same location and internally tracks and simulates the location of hazards on
the road. Ubi uses a three-dimensional graph to represent the trajectories of vehicles
and the potential trajectories of hazards. As more drivers drive around the hazard,
Ubi gains increasing confidence about the type and projected trajectory of hazard.
As the driver approaches the hazard, Ubi sends a warning with the type of hazard
and the estimated distance from the car. The main system components behind Ubi
are shown in Fig. 4.2 and the pseudocode is shown in Fig. 4.3.
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Input:
T – set of trajectories for all vehicles
S – set of sightings of hazard
M – set of obstacles in the map
H – set of movements for hazard from (x, y)
E – set of valid regions where hazard can enter
Output: List of possible hazard paths
1 Nodes← ∅;
2 for t ∈ all times in T do
3 Nodest ← Nodest ∪ Et;
4 Nodest ← Nodest ∩ ¬(Tt ∪Mt);
5 if t ∈ S then
6 Nodest ← Nodest ∩ St;
7 for (x0, y0) ∈ Nodest do
8 for (x1, y1) ∈ Hx0,y0 do
9 collision ←False;
10 Hazard transition = (x0, y0)→ (x1, y1);
11 for car ∈ T do
12 if collides(cart, Hazard transition) then
13 collision ←True;
14 for car ∈ T do
15 Car transition = cart → cart+1;
16 if collides((x1, y1), Car transition) then
17 collision ←True;
18 if collision == False then
19 add node (x1, y1, t+ 1);
20 add edge (x0, y0, t)→ (x1, y1, t+ 1);
21 return List of possible hazard paths
Figure 4.4: Graph search used in Ubi
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4.3.1 Ubi System Input Output
Drivers running Ubi share GPS samples of their location and whether a hazard
was sighted in their vicinity. The cloud operator pools data from multiple drivers near
the same location and uses a graph data structure in two different ways. Suppose
Ubi has received data from time t0 until t1. First, Ubi uses a graph to simulate
an obstacle traveling through the sighted regions between t0 and t1. Ubi attempts
to place multiple hazards in this time range amidst the GPS samples and reported
sightings. Second, when a new car approaches at t2 > t1, Ubi simulates the location
of the most likely hazard (learned from the first use of graph search above) until t2.
Next we describe this graph search, which constitutes the core algorithm used in Ubi.
4.3.2 Graph Search
Ubi uses a graph representation to efficiently find hazards amidst the known ve-
hicle GPS trajectories and through reported sightings. For mobile hazards, Ubi also
finds the possible likely paths the hazard could have taken through the trajectories.
A graph is a natural representation of physical locations and the relationship between
them. The nodes in the graph encode the available open space and edges represent
feasible movements between nodes. The graph is initialized at the starting time and
with a definition of the map including road boundaries and obstacles on the road.
The graph search create nodes only where there is free open space that is not occu-
pied by other known cars. Depending on the mobility of the unknown hazard (e.g.,
a pedestrian, a driver who is turning right at the next intersection) we create edges
with different weights and connectivity.
A step-by-step visual walk-through of the graph construction and graph search is
shown in Fig. 4.6 and the algorithm is shown in Alg. 4.4.
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Figure 4.5: The open space around the GPS trajectories are represented using a
network. Each node represents a potential location for the hazard.
















Figure 4.6: An overview of the steps involved in detecting hazards in Ubi. This
example uses trajectories of simulated bumper cars where the hazard is also a missing
bumper car. This is chosen for ease of visualization. The top row shows the overhead
view during one time step. The bottom row shows the full 3D graph where the Z
axis is used to represent time. The blue lines in the input represent the trajectory
of the input. The sightings are shown in red where the missing bumper car was last
seen. The third step (c) shows how the edges are connected such that the hazard
goes through the sightings. All outside nodes and edges are excluded (Alg. 4.4 #6).
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4.3.2.1 Discretization
In order to use graphs to find possible vehicle trajectories, we first discretize the
continuous information into a grid with a grid size of X, Y, T for each cell. For each
trajectory, we discretize them using D(x, y, t) = (bx(i)/Xc, by(i)/Y c, bt(i)/T c) =
([x]X , [y]Y , [t]T ) = [X]. We have to ensure that the discrete resolution is fine enough
to capture the motion and shape of the hazard but not too fine making it expensive.
For instance, if we are searching for a pedestrian, we need a finer resolution than if we
are searching for a car. In many of our evaluation, we found that X = 1, Y = 1, T = 1
works well. We investigate the trade-off of resolution, accuracy, and computation in
Sec. 4.4.
4.3.2.2 Encode Open Space into Nodes
After discretizing the known trajectories, we create nodes in our graph that
roughly corresponds to the open space around the vehicles. Each node specifically
represents the proposition if the unknown hazard was placed at this location, it will
not collide with the car trajectories. Therefore, given the shape of the unknown haz-
ard (e.g., cars are roughly 4.3m x 1.3m 1), we place them at each location with a
specific orientation that is fixed for that portion in the road segment. This yields a
3D network where each node encodes the (x, y, t) of vehicle. An overhead view of an
example 3D network is shown in Fig. 4.5.
4.3.2.3 Encode Mobility into Edges
Given the open space over time represented as a graph, we encode possible mobility
of hazards through the open space as directed edges.
Ubi searches for hazards of varying mobility — stationary, slow- and fast-moving.
For each type of hazard, we define a mobility model which specifies how much the
1https://sumo.dlr.de/wiki/Vehicle_Type_Parameter_Defaults
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Car obstacle in front Approaching exit on right
(a) Edge weights encoding the likelihood of
transition of a reckless driver hazard. If the
hazard is next to the edge of the road they are
likely to continue straight.
hazard could have moved in one time step. The mobility models of a slow-moving









Figure 4.8: Mobility models for 4 different hazard types. Each scatter plot represents
the full range of possible movement in one time step with the hazard starting at (0, 0).
We also compared these with a stationary obstacle that isn’t shown here.
Possible Movement: Physical Constraints Starting at T = 0, we connect
nodes to subsequent time steps based on the possible mobility shown in Fig. 4.8. The
edges represent how the hazard could have moved through the time steps. In the case
of stationary hazards all edges are simply connected to the same node in the next
time step, i.e. all edges point directly up in our 3D directed graph. When connected
nodes based on the mobility model, we have to ensure there is no collision with other
known trajectories. This is enforced in two different conditions.
First, moving the unknown hazard from X to Y from T0 to T1 must not jump
over any known trajectories of other vehicles in between the two time steps. Due
to the discretization of time, this overlap of trajectories and hazards may occur in
between the two time steps. We resolve this by checking the continuous-space location
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of the cars in between T0 and T1 to ensure no collision happens between T0 and T1.
(Alg. 4.4 #10-13) The second requirement is that no other known trajectories overlap
with the unknown hazard between the two time steps due to their own movement.
This occurs even if the unknown hazard doesn’t move between the two time steps.
A lack of motion may still be in violation of other vehicle motions (Alg. 4.4 #14-
17). Resolving these two constraints gives us a full list of possible movements of the
unknown hazard.
Probable Movement: Behavioral Constraints After connecting all possible
transitions between open-space nodes, we are still left with an over-estimation of
where the unknown hazard may be in our graph. This is due to the behavioral
probabilities of how different entities behave in the real world. For example, a car is
likely to stay within the lane or go in the right direction on a one-way road. Although
it is physically possible to go in the opposite direction, this is highly unlikely. Fig. 4.7a
shows example likelihoods of a reckless driver hazard given the position on the road.
We set the edge weight to reflect the transition likelihood.
Specifically, we assign a higher transition likelihood based on two factors: (1) the
prior probability distribution of hazard mobility (e.g., bicyclists are more likely to go
straight) and (2) physical constraints on the road such as collision with other vehicles
or obstacles on the road.
4.3.2.4 Find Shortest Path
After creating the graph and connecting the edges, we use Dijkstra’s algorithm to
find the shortest weighted path through the network. We further add the constraint
that the path has to pass through the known sightings of the unknown vehicle. For
each run of Ubi we have a set of possible paths through the network. The shortest
weighted path is the path with the smallest sum of weights of its edges. This path
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gives us the most likely path through the graph since the edge weights are inversely
proportional to the likelihood of the transition. Choosing the shortest path gives a
more accurate and more likely trajectory of the hazard.
4.3.3 Using graph search to warn drivers
Ubi uses the graph search described above in two different steps of its operation.
The pseudocode of Ubi is shown in Fig. 4.3. In the first application of the graph
search, Ubi uses multiple sightings of the hazard to determine the most likely hazard.
In the extreme cases, if the hazards have very different mobility models, it may
be possible to uniquely identify the hazard simply using the sighting. If that isn’t
possible, Ubi uses the edge weights from the graph search to determine the most likely
hazard.
Next it uses the same graph search tool to forward simulate the most likely hazard.
From the last known sighting, Ubi incrementally applies the hazard mobility model
to the graph to get a set of possible location of the hazard. Ubi then averages the
set of possible locations and uses that to determine the distance from the upcoming
vehicle.
4.4 Evaluation
We first evaluate the accuracy of the warning detection system, and then the
requirements and runtime of the graph search algorithm in isolation.
4.4.1 Evaluation of the Warning System
Ubi receives GPS locations from each driver and returns a warning if there is a
hazard up ahead and the distance to the hazard. As each driver gets near the hazard,
Ubi creates a new sighting and run the graph search to detect the type of hazard. For
all GPS samples of cars before they encounter the hazard, Ubi uses the graph search
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to simulate the location of the hazard from the last sighting and reports the average
location from the approaching car.
We compare Ubi’s warnings against the correct expected behavior. Before the
first driver encounters the hazard, the expected behavior is that there is no warning
returned from Ubi, as it hasn’t seen the hazard yet. After the first driver reports a
sighting, the correct behavior is to warn upcoming drivers that there is a stationary
obstacle detected at that fixed location. As more drivers report sightings of the
hazard, the correct behavior is to report the exact type of hazard and the accurate
distance to the hazard.
These experiments were done in simulation using three different hazard models —
a stationary obstacle, a pedestrian (traveling up to 1.5m/s) and biker (traveling up to
5.5m/s) [99]. The speed and acceleration parameters of the models were chosen from
the SUMO vehicle type parameters.2 We simulated 2 different types of mobility for
each hazard with all three hazards moving on the side of the road (1) going straight
close to their max speed, and (2) accelerating up to their max speed. The mobility
template for all types of hazards is shown in Fig. 4.8.
4.4.1.1 Warning Accuracy
Fig. 4.9 shows an example output of Ubi to warn a driver of an upcoming pedes-
trian on the side of the road. Initially, when Ubi collects only a few sightings of the
hazard, it tends to incorrectly classify the hazard type. As it collects more sight-
ings, it can more accurately detect the hazard type. The distance to the hazard also
depends on the correctness of the classification. If it is estimated to be the wrong
hazard type, the estimated distance suffers due to incorrect forward simulation of the
hazard type from the last sighting.
We measured the accuracy of the hazard warning for fixed speed hazards. The
2https://sumo.dlr.de/docs/Vehicle_Type_Parameter_Defaults.html
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Figure 4.9: The left figure shows the distance from the hazard. Vertical lines show the
time of the sightings of the hazard by all cars in the simulation, which is also reflected
in the right figure to show the location where the sighting took place. The colored
scatter points on the left figure represent Ubi’s response to the driver, showing both
the classification and the distance to the hazard.
(a) Ubi warning accuracy for fixed-speed
hazards.
(b) Ubi warning accuracy for accelerating
hazards
results are shown in Fig. 4.10a. The hazard was placed near the middle of the track in
the simulation, and therefore once vehicles went past the hazard, they were no longer
notified, therefore around 50% of the GPS points receive no response from Ubi. For
the remaining, we measured the number of missed (shown in red) warnings where
Ubi didn’t give any warning of an upcoming hazard, the number of warnings of a the
wrong type (shown in orange), number of warnings that include the actual hazard
and other hazards (light green) and warnings that only specify the current hazard
(dark green).
In most instances, we found that Ubi rarely misses giving any sort of warning.
For stationary hazards, Ubi failed to give a warning only 8 out of 143 requests (94.4%
correct). For pedestrian and biker hazards, Ubi gave the wrong warning 10 out of
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168 requests (94% correct) and 7 out of 168 requests (95.8% correct), respectively.
For the rest of the requests, Ubi either warned the driver of the correct hazard
type (dark green) or returned a set of hazards which included the correct hazard
type (light green). Ubi may return a set containing multiple possible hazards if the
sightings are compatible with multiple hazard types. The pedestrian and biker hazard
mobility models (shown in Fig. 4.8) are very distinct when they move at fixed speeds,
and hence those two hazard types are not confused for another type. However, the
stationary obstacle is often confused for a pedestrian obstacle since a pedestrian may
move slowly near where the stationary obstacle was sighted. This results in a large
number (110 out of 143) of warnings which include both pedestrian and stationary
hazard warnings.
We further explored the relationship between overlapping hazard types and warn-
ings by using an accelerating hazard model (second two figures in Fig. 4.8). The
accuracy results are shown in Fig. 4.10b. We found that Ubi still rarely failed to give
a warning of an upcoming mobile hazard. However, there is a much higher ambiguity
about the hazard type. For an accelerating pedestrian hazard, Ubi often warned the
driver that the upcoming hazard may be a pedestrian or another hazard type (107
out of 116 warnings). This ambiguity is also increased for the accelerating biker haz-
ard but is not a pronounced because after collecting a few sightings, Ubi is able to
distinguish the biker from the slow-moving pedestrian.
4.4.1.2 Density and GPS Noise
Next we studied the impact of car density and GPS noise in Ubi hazard warnings.
First, we varied the density of cars on the road with the stationary, pedestrian or biker
hazard. The impact on detection accuracy and distance error is shown in Fig. 4.11.
For very low-density traffic, Ubi receives fewer sightings of the hazard. This results
in more misclassifications of the hazard. We found that for very low density, only
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Figure 4.11: Accuracy and distance errors for varying density of cars. “Included”
results show the responses which included multiple hazards, including the correct
hazard. “Exclusive” results show the responses which only warn the driver about the
correct hazard.
≈ 30% of warnings for a pedestrian hazard classify the hazard as a pedestrian, but
≈ 95% of warnings report a set of hazards including the pedestrian and others. This
is also reflected in the distance reported by the Ubi warning. For very low density,
the pedestrian hazard average error is ≈ 13m, which drops to ≈ 2m for higher density
traffic. This occurs because Ubi determines that with few sightings, the hazard could
be multiple different options. Forward simulation with the wrong hazard type results
in a wrong estimate of the actual position of the hazard.
Next we studied the effect of GPS noise in Ubi classification and distance reports.
To measure the impact of GPS noise, we down-sampled the simulated trajectory to
1Hz, and added random distributed noise scaled up to four different values. The
results are shown in Fig. 4.12.
In general, we found that Ubi warning accuracy and distance is unaffected by GPS
noise. However, if we have high GPS noise, Ubi is unable to correctly warn drivers
of stationary obstacles. This occurs because the graph search algorithm connects
nodes from (t0, x0, y0) to (t1, x1, t1) only if it is possible for the hazard to travel from
(x0, y0) to (x1, y1) in one time step without colliding with any known trajectories.
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Figure 4.12: Accuracy and distance errors for varying GPS noise. The different noise
values were chosen from [52].
As we increase the GPS noise, the “known trajectories” appear more noisy and cause
more collisions with the hazard paths. For mobile hazards, such as a pedestrian or
a bicyclist, this algorithm is able to find a path through the noisy trajectories and
still find a path which connects the hazard sightings, but for stationary obstacles it
is unable to do this. This makes the stationary obstacle detection brittle to high
GPS noise. If high GPS noise is detected, we can switch to simpler methods for
tracking stationary obstacles such as those used by existing navigation apps (e.g.,
Google Maps).
4.4.2 Evaluation of Graph Search
Next we evaluated the accuracy of the graph search in detecting stationary, slow-
and fast-moving hazards. The graph search algorithm is used twice inside the Ubi
algorithm. First, it is used to detect the most likely hazard given the sightings. Next,
it is used to predict the location of the hazard and warn future drivers.
We measured the number of sightings required before we can confidently label each
hazard type. We evaluated this using Movsim [99] to create trajectories from vehicles
driving around the hazard. We drew sightings around the hazard and ran applied the
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search to evaluate whether the hazard was detected under different conditions.
(a) Stationary obstacle haz-
ard FPR
(b) Slow moving hazard
FPR
(c) Reckless driver hazard
FPR
Figure 4.13: Heatmap of false positive rate for each hazard type. The number of
sightings varied from 1–6 and the density of cars changes from light (250 cars per
hour), medium (500 cars per hour) and dense (1000 cars per hour).
If the dataset contains a hazard, this is considered a positive test case. If Ubi finds
a hazard in this dataset, that is a true positive and if it fails to find a hazard, that is
a false negative. We also drew random sightings where there is no hazard to create a
negative test case. If Ubi finds a hazard in this dataset, that is a false positive and if
it doesn’t find a hazard, that is a true negative.
4.4.2.1 Simulation Dataset
Using Movsim [99], we simulated 3 different hazards — a stationary stopped car, a
slow-moving bicyclist, and a fast-moving reckless driver. The vehicle parameters are
defined in https://sumo.dlr.de/docs/Vehicle_Type_Parameter_Defaults.html.
For each hazard, we varied the density of the other vehicles on the road and the
number of sightings where the hazard was spotted by neighboring cars.
The density is defined in terms of number of cars per lane per hour. We simulated
for 250 cars per hour (‘light’), 500 (‘medium’) and 1000 (‘dense’). The road is 500m
long and cars were randomly generated to travel through the road segment avoiding
the hazard. The cars use the MOBIL lane-changing model to avoid hazards and
change lanes among other vehicles [55].
We created 10 different random scenarios and ran the simulation for 30 seconds.
We first evaluated the effect of density and number of sightings in the false positive
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rate (Sec. 4.4.2.2). In order to keep the FPR low, Ubi requires a certain density of
cars and reported sightings. In all cases in our simulation, Ubi was able to correctly
detect the hazard if it exists in the scenario (i.e., TPR = 1 in all cases). However, if
we decrease the distance between neighboring cars or if the discretization of the graph
is very coarse-grained, the TPR suffers. We explore this in Sec. 4.4.2.3. Changing
the discretization resolution affects the run-time of the algorithm. The run-time is
measured in Sec. 4.4.2.4
4.4.2.2 False Positive Rate
The false positive rate depends on three factors — the mobility of the hazard,
the number of sightings, and the density of the known cars. Fig. 4.13 shows three
heatmaps of the FPR while varying the number of sightings and the density of the
cars. We can see the pattern for different types of hazards with different mobility.
If there is low mobility (e.g., a stationary hazard), then even two false sighting
reports are enough to rule out the hazard. As seen in the heatmap, we have no false
positives for stationary obstacles if we require 2 or more sightings. However, if the
hazard has higher mobility, then multiple false sightings might still be a valid way for
the hazard to move, and therefore a false positive is reported. However, if we require
multiple sightings (e.g., 3 sightings for slow-moving and 5 for fast-moving) the false
positives drop.
We can use this as a guideline to adjust the false positive rate. If we are using Ubi
to find a stationary hazard, we require 2 or more sightings. If it is a highly mobile
hazard, then we must record multiple sightings before we use Ubi to find the hazard in
order to avoid false positives. The exact number of sightings depends on the density
of the cars in that region and the type of hazard. The trade-off here is that to require
more sightings means it takes longer to detect the hazard after it appears on the road.
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(a) True positive rate. The
density varies from 1000–
2000 cars per hour and the
discrete grid size changes
from 1m2–5m2.
(b) Runtime of Ubi. We mea-
sured the run time for differ-
ent hazards and different res-
olutions 1m2–5m2.
4.4.2.3 Effect of discrete grid resolution
In the simulations above, the true positive rate (TPR) was always 100%. The
TPR (defined as TP
TP+FN
) is affected by the density of the cars and the resolution for
the graph. We varied these two parameters and measured the true positive rate in
simulation, shown in Fig. 4.14a. As the resolution becomes more coarse-grained, the
TPR tends to be worse. This is further exacerbated with a high density of cars on
the road.
This pattern occurs because a coarse-grained resolution is unable to represent cars
that are close to each other without collision. Ubi’s graph search models the physical
possible movement of the hazard in the discrete realm (details in Sec. 4.3.2.3). With
a coarser resolution, there are no possible movements to match the sightings of the
vehicle because even small movements result in collision with nearby vehicles.
With a grid size of 1m2, the TPR is very high throughout our analysis and only
starts to drop as we reach 2000+ cars per hour. To accommodate higher density road
segments, we can increase the resolution of the graph, but this results in a higher run
time. The run time is further explored in the next section.
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4.4.2.4 Run-time measurement
The run time of the graph search depends on multiple factors. Mainly, it is
affected by the resolution and the number of steps the hazard can take at each time
step (Variable H in Alg. 4.4 #8). For a stationary hazard, it only has one possible
movement from one time step to the next. For a mobile hazard, the faster it can
move, the more possible steps it can take from one time step to the next.
The number of nodes in the graph is upper-bounded by M ×N × T , where MN
is the number of cells needed to represent the discrete grid and T is the number of
discrete time steps. The number of edges depends on how many possible steps each
hazard can take. The upper bound for the number of steps is M ×N × T ×H where
H is the number of possible movements the hazard can take at each time step.
Once we find the possible set of movements, we use Dijkstra’s algorithm to find
the shortest path for each pair of possible nodes from the start to finish. The run
time of Dijkstra’s algorithm is upper bounded by O(|E|+ |V |log|V |). If there are En
possible entry nodes and Ex possible exit nodes, we repeat the graph search En×Ex
times.
The measured run time for each type of hazard and different resolution is shown in
Fig. 4.14b. As we increased the grid size from 1 to 5 m2, there was a sharp decrease
in run time for each type of hazard. For a stationary hazard, the line of best fit
has a -5.8 negative slope, and the slow-moving hazard has -16.6 and the fast-moving
hazard has -284. The fast-moving hazard is better fit with an exponential curve with
a -4 exponent. The biggest factor influencing the run time is the number of possible
movements by each of the hazard. The fast-moving hazard has the most number
of possible movements at each time step. This results in many more edges in the
network, which requires more computation to search through the network to find
paths which contain the hazard.
These results were obtained on a 2.1 Ghz Intel Xeon E5 processor. The current
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implementation only uses one core of the CPU and can be improved using multi-
ple cores. The algorithm is inherently parallelizable since we operate on multiple
independent nodes at the same time from one time step to the next. We can use
existing parallel processing frameworks such as MapReduce3 to process the nodes in
a distributed manner.
The output of the graph search can be used in a real-time or a semi-real-time way
depending on the underlying application. If it is a dangerous hazard (e.g., a reckless
driver) or is in a highly populated area, then it is important to report the results to
upcoming drivers in real-time. If it is a non-time-critical hazard such as a pothole, it
is sufficient to detect and report this at a later time.
4.5 Discussion and Future Work
Possible deployment strategies Existing navigation apps such as Google Maps
or Waze already notify drivers of stationary obstacles in the path of traffic. For
example, through crowd-sourced reports, Waze can report if there is a stopped car
on the road. Using Ubi they can extend their coverage to include mobile hazards
as well. If a few drivers report the presence of a pedestrian on the side of the road,
using Ubi these navigation applications can warn drivers ahead of time. Alternatively,
we can also build Ubi as a standalone application which accepts reports of hazard
sightings. It can collect this on a central cloud and distribute it back to drivers with
Ubi installed on their phones if there is a hazard nearby.
Security and Privacy implications The downside of distributing Ubi as a stan-
dalone application is that it shares the user’s location across multiple service providers,
thereby putting their location privacy at risk of exposure. It is, therefore, advisable
that existing widely-deployed navigation service providers adopt Ubi into their sys-
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/MapReduce
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tem. If it must be deployed as a standalone application, we can further explore adding
differentially-private noise into the location acquired from each driver in order to pro-
tect the user’s privacy but at the same time accurately determine the location of the
hazard. This is part of our future work.
Another direction of future research is whether it is possible for a malicious actor
to poison the data that feeds into Ubi and falsely report a hazard where there is
none. An attacker who poisons the system can then influence routes suggested by
navigation applications and create a free route for their own travel. This is partly
mitigated by design because we require that multiple users report sightings before we
flag a hazard (see Sec. 4.4.2.2). In future, we will test the robustness of Ubi to such
data poisoning attacks.
4.6 Conclusion
Traditional methods to detect dangerous driving hazards requires sophisticated
vision-based sensors or are restricted to stationary obstacles. We have proposed a
novel method and system, called Ubi, which only uses GPS trajectories from nearby
vehicles and reported sightings to detect and track the presence of stationary and
mobile hazardous object. Our system doesn’t require direct GPS traces from the
hazard itself, and works for detecting stationary as well as mobile hazards.
Ubi is shown to be able to detect hazards with very high accuracy (> 94%) and
with low distance error (< 3.5m). Ubi is also resilient to GPS noise up to 25m and
can be implemented efficiently using a directed graph and therefore leverages existing
graph search algorithms such as Dijkstra’s shortest path algorithm.
Ubi can be integrated into existing navigation applications. By integrating sta-
tionary and mobile hazard detection into their systems, navigation applications can
consider the safety of the route to the destination in addition to the traditional con-
siderations of shortest travel time.
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CHAPTER V
CAB: On-demand Vehicular Data Collection Builder
5.1 Introduction
Vehicular research and app development spans a wide range of interests and re-
quirements such as driver monitoring [87, 54, 96], road hazards detection [32, 3,
103], and vehicular security [72, 49, 68]. There are also numerous consumer-focused
vehicular apps such as driver status monitoring or driving score evaluation [101, 6].
However, there is a high barrier of entry to engage in automotive research or
app development. A researcher or an app developer needs to understand how to
collect, process and interpret driving behavior from low-level sensor data, set up
all the communication channels to collect data and interpret them for research or
consumer-facing app development purposes. This expensive startup barrier deters
researchers or consumers from venturing into this field. This is a detriment to rapid
prototyping of vehicular apps, and therefore slows down consumer-facing vehicular
app development.
To remove or mitigate this barrier, we need an easily configurable vehicular app
builder which allows users to build and launch data-collection campaigns without

















Figure 5.1: Three parties involved in CAB. Algorithm developers contribute code to
the CAB repository. App designers, which could be researchers or app developers,
submit high-level requirements. The CAB server takes the available algorithms and
automatically compiles a data-collection app. The Experiment participant joins the
data collection and installs the data-collection app
5.1.1 State of the Art
Consumer-facing data-collection apps either provide high-level statistics which
cannot be re-configured for different purposes [6, 101] or provide raw low-level infor-
mation which isn’t useful for consumers without sophisticated technical knowledge
[36, 44]. Furthermore, academic researchers often build a new data-collection plat-
form for each investigation, which results in time-consuming and often duplicated
effort [42, 17, 95]. Existing data-collection platforms lack the flexibility to be used
across multiple studies [95, 64, 8, 82, 48]. They often collect excessive and poten-
tially irrelevant data or are built for a specific purpose and are not customizable for
different data-collection needs.
Due to the lack of re-configurable data-collection platforms, consumers and re-
searchers are deterred from entering into this field of automotive data collection and
research.
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5.1.2 Proposed System: CAB
We propose a novel system called CAB (Car App Builder) to meet the above-
mentioned need. CAB is a configurable data-collection app builder that is useful for
non-technical users as well as app developers who want to rapidly prototype their
vehicular app. The primary goal of CAB is to reduce the effort needed to build data-
collection apps and engage in vehicular data collection and research.
CAB uses a simple user interface to accept the requirements of the data-collection
app and automatically compiles an app to perform the data collection, creates a
sandboxed server to accept and communicate data, and a website where users can
sign up and configure their data-collection app. Collectively, we call the app, server
and website as the “data-collection platform.” An app developer can further take the
auto-generated data-collection platform and prototype their own ideas on top of it,
reducing the overhead needed to test their ideas.
Fig. 5.1 shows the system components of CAB. There are three main parties who in-
teract with CAB. A data-collection app designer submits the high-level data-collection
requirements to the CAB server. The server proposes a data-collection strategy which
includes a set of algorithms running on the user’s phone, server-side components and
website components which meets these requirements. The second party, the algorithm
developer, contributes individual algorithms to the CAB repository. They provide the
source code for each algorithm and specify the required information and the produced
output information. The submitted algorithms are compiled as needed for each data-
collection platform. Finally, the third party, the data-collection participant, installs
the compiled app created by CAB.
5.1.3 Key Technical Details
CAB has two main technical features which enable its use for diverse data-collection
needs. Fig. 5.2 shows the system architecture of CAB.
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‘Information’ ⇔ ‘Algorithm’ Interface. At the heart of CAB is the language-
agnostic definition of information and algorithm. An algorithm is a module in the CAB
repository which defines a set of information types it requires and the information
type that it outputs. This interface between algorithms and information enables the
following features:
• Automatic dependency resolution. CAB automatically crawls the graph of in-
formation and algorithms to find the set of dependencies needed to meet the
data-collection requirements.
• Distributed development. Multiple developers can define algorithms and con-
tribute to the shared CAB repository. The algorithms are interconnected using
this well-defined algorithm-information interface.
• Redundant algorithms. Multiple algorithms may produce the same information
using different means. For example, if a user doesn’t have an OBD dongle, a dif-
ferent algorithm may produce the same information by estimating the required
information using only phone sensors. This increases the reach and deployability
of the apps compiled using CAB.
Automatic Compilation into Sandboxed Environment. Once an app de-
signer submits a new data-collection requirement CAB automatically identifies the set
of dependencies and compiles a custom data-collection platform.
It creates an isolated environment for this data-collection campaign and links the
relevant data-collection algorithms from the repository. This includes Android-based
components, server-side scripts, and website user-interface components which are
necessary for this data collection platform. CAB launches a separate linking server for
each data collection campaign. The linking server allows different algorithms to work
together seamlessly to receive and upload data that is required for their operation.
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5.1.4 Results
Our evaluation shows that CAB can be used to build diverse data-collection apps,
with diverse requirements. We implemented 3 different data-collection apps in CAB
to show its versatility — fuel consumption data collection, vehicle sensor estimation,
and crowd-sourced obstacle detection. In each scenario, CAB reduced the effort needed
to program and build the data collection platform. We demonstrate that with 18
different modules which we implemented in this work, we can create 8,100 unique
data collection applications, which is a 450× return in developer effort. Next, we did
a usability study with domain-expert and non-expert researchers. The participants
were likely to use CAB for their own data collection needs and find that it reduces the
effort needed to launch a data collection campaign as well as develop novel algorithms.
5.1.5 Contributions
This chapter makes the following contributions.
• An open-source data-collection builder, CAB, which accepts high-level data col-
lection requirements and automatically builds custom data collection platforms.
• A collection of 18 algorithms developed using CAB, which can be assembled to
create 8,100 unique data collection platforms.
• A user interface for researchers to specify and launch their own data collection
platforms. A demo of the interface is found on YouTube1




Vehicular data collection research spans multiple areas, a subset of which are
shown in Table 5.1.
Most of the studies involving data collection transform low-level sensor data (ac-
cessed via a smartphone or an OBD dongle) into higher-level information. For ex-
ample, Hong et al. [45] transformed smartphone sensors into a dangerous driving
classifier. Chen et al. [17] transformed IMU data into lane-changing and turning be-
havior. Many other studies in dangerous driving detection also transformed low-level
sensor data in a similar way [113, 17, 60, 61, 45, 18].
Environment-modeling studies require a server-side component to collect data
from multiple vehicles. For instance, Jiang et al. [52] collected pothole information
across multiple drivers in a central cloud. Wang et al. [106] developed CrowdAtlas,
a system which combines GPS traces multiple drivers to automatically update maps
with driving data. Many of these systems also require training machine learning
models which is better suited to a resource-heavy server. For instance, Zheng et
al. [118] trained a neural network to predict air quality in cities, as task which is best
suited to a resource-rich machine rather than directly on the smartphone.
Finally, many applications require user input to collect information which cannot
be learned through sensors. For example, Hong et al. [45] required questionnaires
to learn about the driver’s history of accidents and build a dangerous driving pro-
file model. Chen and Shin [16] used crowd-sourced reports to collect ground truth
information about unprotected left turns. All these methods require a versatile user
interface to collect information from users. Many consumer applications such as
Google Maps [41] and Waze [108] require user input to collect the presence of speed
traps of obstacles on the road.
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Driver-modeling Environment-modeling Vehicle-modeling
Drowsiness detection [87, 112] Pothole detection [32, 92, 91] CO2 emission analysis [22]
Driver fingerprinting [28, 15, 60, 117] Digital maps [16, 23, 3, 47] Vehicle turning detection [17, 105, 64]
Dangerous driving [45, 67] City-wide monitoring [40, 118, 95] Speed estimation [114, 51]
Table 5.1: Selection of studies which require data collection categorized by whether
the focus of the study is to model the driver, the environment or the vehicle.
5.2.1 Design Goals
Based on the requirements of vehicular studies involving data collection, we con-
solidated a list of design goals to be met by CAB. First, we have a list of functional
design goals that must be supported by CAB as follows:
1. Low-level sensor access translated into high-level information. CAB
must be able to transform low-level sensor data to high-level information. Sensor
data must be accessed from the phone, OBD or other supporting devices. CAB
must be easily extensible to support new high-level information as they are
discovered in the research community.
2. Server-side processing. CAB must provide seamless communication of data
between the smartphone and server-side scripts. Server-side processing is re-
quired for heavy-duty computation when data must be shared across multiple
drivers.
3. User interaction. CAB must provide the ability to interact with the user to
acquire user-supplied information such as their reports about their mood. The
user interaction platform should support many forms of intuitive interaction
such as text-based forms and buttons.
In addition to the functional requirements, CAB’s main goal is to reduce the ef-
fort required by app designers and algorithm developers. To this end, we have two
additional design goals.
(4) Effort reduction for app designers. CAB must provide a simple interface









































Figure 5.2: CAB system architecture.
platforms. CAB must simplify the data-collection process by presenting the col-
lected data and interfacing with participants in data-collection experiments.
(5) Effort reduction for algorithm developers. CAB must provide a simple pro-
grammatic API and development environment where developers can implement
their own algorithm and integrate with the CAB ecosystem.
5.3 System
CAB is a reconfigurable on-demand data-collection builder useful for data-collection
campaigns and rapid prototyping of data-collection apps. It accepts high-level re-
quirements from users and automatically assembles a data-collection platform with
all the necessary infrastructure to carry out complex data-collection campaigns across
multiple devices. CAB can also be easily extended to add more functionality through
a shared central code repository.
In what follows, we describe the system components of CAB which make it possi-
ble to automatically build data-collection campaigns to meet different requirements.
The discussion is organized around the three main parties involved in CAB, shown
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Platform Language User interaction % phones
Android Java Low-level phone sensors 39.8% 2
React TypeScript Web interface 77% 3
Python scripts Python3.7 Texts or phone calls 95% 4
Table 5.2: Algorithms can be developed for 3 different platforms. All algorithms share
the common interface so data can be communicated across each other seamlessly.
Each algorithm is implemented in a language that has typing support to enforce the
proper formatting of information.
in Fig. 5.1. We describe the system architecture pertaining to each party and their
interaction with CAB. Fig. 5.2 shows the overall system architecture. The high-level
specification files and their relationships are summarized in Fig. 5.3 and detailed in
their respective sections below.
5.3.1 Algorithm Developer
CAB builds data collection apps by sampling from a library of algorithms con-
tributed to the shared repository. An “algorithm” is a self-contained module defined
in one of the three supported languages shown in Table 5.2. The three languages
meet the three functional design requirements. Algorithms implemented in Android
are best suited for low-level sensor access (design goal #1). Python-based algorithms
are best suited for server-side processing (design goal #2) and React-based algorithms
can define complex user interfaces (design goal #3).
Each algorithm defines an interface in a JSON file which defines all required
input information and the output information. An example interface file is shown in
Fig. 5.10a. All algorithms share a common language of information, including the
information name, a shared understanding of its meaning, and a data type, defined
in a language-independent JSON file shown in Fig. 5.10a.
CAB provides a tool to auto-generate the algorithm stubs given an algorithm defi-
nition of input and output. The auto generation tool ensures each algorithm conforms
to the interface required to communicate with other algorithms and helps jumpstart
















Figure 5.3: CAB uses several high-level configuration files to automatically generate
data-collection platforms. Examples of all configuration files are shown in the Ap-
pendix. It uses the script cl-algorithm to convert the spec.json file into algorithm
stubs to be filled in by the algorithm developer. Using cl-strategy, it converts
the high-level requirements input by the app designer (requirements.json) to get
a detailed strategy file which lists all algorithms and dependencies (strategy.json)
to be included in the data collection app. Finally, it uses cl-package to compile the
data-collection app, build the data-collection website, and initialize a virtual machine
for each data-collection platform.
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velopment of new algorithms for the CAB repository, thereby meeting design goal #5.
The auto-generation tool can be invoked using
cl-algorithm <specfile.json>. This command creates all the necessary classes
to interface with the CAB library and includes the required library files, which we
implemented separately for each platform. It also creates function headers which
accept input information as function parameters and return the output information
(abstract classes in Java, Components with props in React, and Classes with functions
in Python). The data type for the function header is loaded from the registry JSON
file. Once created, the algorithm developer can simply fill in the function stub to
transform the input information and return the output information. The CAB library
ensures that the required input information is collected and fed into the function and
the output return value is properly sent to the CAB server and multiplexed to the
appropriate algorithm which requires that information. An example auto-generated
function stub for the above algorithm spec is shown in Fig. 5.4. The algorithm class
also explicitly defines the list of functions and their input and output information
types. The explicit definition is used later when automatically compiling algorithms
into a data-collection platform.
5.3.2 App Designer
An app designer submits a high-level requirement to CAB and decides on a set of
algorithms which may span multiple platforms to meet the data-collection require-
ments. CAB uses the requirement file to assemble all required algorithms into a package
for each platform and runs them simultaneously during the data-collection process.




public class Algorithm extends AlgorithmBase {
@Override
public Float[] produceVehiclePointingRotation (
Float3 m, Float3 gps, Float3 g) {
// Write code here
}
@Override
public Float3 produceVehicleAlignedAccel (
Float3 accel, Float [] rotation) {
// Write code here
}
}
Figure 5.4: Java algorithm implementation stub auto generated using CAB. A similar
function is auto generated for Python and React-based algorithms.
5.3.2.1 Refining the data-collection strategy
The app designer submits the basic requirements, via a requirements.json file —
an example shown in Appendix Fig. 5.10c — to CAB. The requirements file specifies
the list of information that is required, the list of forbidden sensors (e.g., GPS),
and the set of platforms for this data-collection requirement. CAB uses the internal
representation of the available algorithms and their information to find the set of
algorithms which output the required information. CAB furthermore crawls all the
input requirements of the algorithms to resolve their dependencies. The user can
further specify which algorithm to use if there is a choice. If no choice is given, we
choose all algorithms for added redundancy. CAB outputs the final set of algorithms
needed to satisfy the input requirements and saves this to a strategy.json file,
example shown in Appendix Fig. 5.10d.
The graph used to resolve algorithmic dependencies is shown in the middle in
Fig. 5.3. This graph is automatically generated with all the information types, and
the algorithm specification files submitted by developers. As more developers con-
tribute more algorithms and refine registry.json, the graph is automatically up-
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dated thereby providing more sophisticated algorithms to app designers.
We have built a simple web UI to generate the requirements file so that a non-
technical users can also generate a valid file without writing JSON specifications. We
will give an example this web UI in the evaluation section. By only requiring the
high-level specification file and a user-friendly web UI, we meet design goal #4. This
significantly reduces the effort of an app designer to create and launch their own
data-collection platform.
5.3.2.2 Compiling required algorithms
Once the app designer confirms the data-collection strategy, CAB uses that to com-
pile the relevant algorithms together. We created a script
(cl-package strategy.json) which translates strategy.json into a standalone
project for each platform. All Android algorithms are linked into an Android project
which is compiled into an APK. All Python algorithms are loaded as separate mod-
ules and invoked by a Python script running on the CAB server. The React algorithms
are loaded as components into a website also running on the CAB server.
The linking process is different for each platform. For Android algorithms, al-
gorithms are included as separate Gradle modules. Their paths and module names
are defined in the settings.gradle file. They are also included in the projects
build.gradle file and are therefore compiled during run-time. All further depen-
dencies of the algorithms are defined in their own project and recursively resolved
during compile time. Similarly, Python modules are defined as Python libraries and
are symbolically linked into the project folder for this data-collection platform. React
algorithms are compiled as separate Node modules and are linked together using the
node package manager.
Once the algorithm dependencies are loaded into the project folder, the cl-package






public class PackageStrategy extends Strategy {
public PackageStrategy () {





// An "AlgorithmFunction" is a custom class that












Figure 5.5: Auto-generated code connecting different algorithms loaded for Android.
This file is auto-generated and doesn’t need to be edited by the app designer.
invoke the callback functions if necessary. The example statically generated code for
Android is shown in Fig. 5.5. A similar strategy file is generated for Python and
React (TypeScript). A technical developer can modify the auto-generated code to
add their own functionality to the packaged data-collection application. This enables
rapid prototyping, contributing towards design goal #5.
5.3.2.3 Routing information across algorithms
One of the primary services provided by CAB is the seamless communication of data
across different algorithms. This communication happens both inside the platform
and across platforms. For Android algorithms which require low-level sensor data
(such as GPS or IMU sensors), CAB creates the necessary listeners to read that sensor
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Endpoints Parameters Return
POST /createuser username, password Success message
GET /login username, password Session ID used for all future transactions
POST /add session, information, file or value Success message
GET /list session, information, sincetime List of data points
GET /latest session, information Latest data point
Table 5.3: API endpoints exposed by the linking server. A new linking server is
started for each data collection application. All platforms (Android, React and
Python scripts) make HTTP calls to the linking server to communicate information
to other platforms.
information. The data is then passed into the algorithm’s callback function. If the
information is required by other algorithms running on a different platform, then it is
packaged and uploaded to a linking server. Each data-collection campaign contains
a separate linking server which is responsible for marshaling between algorithms, for
saving data and user management. The linking server exposes RESTful API endpoints
for uploading and downloading relevant data, shown in Table 5.3.
5.3.2.4 Isolating application in a virtual machine
CAB spawns a new virtual machine instance to hold platform-specific files. The
virtual machine contains the linking server responsible for sharing information be-
tween algorithms within each platform. The linking server runs on a fixed port inside
the virtual machine and is forwarded to a different uniquely chosen port in the host
machine. The host machine’s port is exposed to the outside so that Android-based
algorithms can interface with the appropriate linking server. This also allows us to
run multiple platforms on the same server. The virtual machine also contains all the
data and maintains a database of users for that data-collection app.
5.3.3 Experiment Participant
A participant registers for the data-collection campaign through the linking server
with a username and password. This adds a new entry to the users database for that
data-collection campaign. Once they create an account, they are presented with a
URL to access the React-based algorithms and a link to download the APK containing
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the Android-based algorithms. They log in to the website and on their Android app
using the same login information from before.
If the data-collection campaign includes an algorithm which accepts text messages
from the user, the linking server also registers the user’s phone number with the
texting server database. The texting server is a public-facing server that runs on on
a fixed port on the host machine. It records the port number of the linking server,
the session ID and the phone number of the user. We use an external texting service
called Twilio5 to send and receive texts. Whenever the user responds to a text, it is
received by the Twilio service which then invokes a web hook running on the texting
server with the message information. The texting server looks up the appropriate
linking server which registered this phone number and forwards the message.
5.4 Implementation
The CAB server, texting server, and linking servers were implemented in 385 lines
of Ruby on Rails. The Android CAB library was written in 3101 lines of Java and 246
lines of XML. The Python library was written in 139 lines of Python3.7 and the React
library was written in 109 lines of TypeScript. Additionally, each project is wrapped
in a platform-specific code which includes all developer-specific algorithms (output
from cl-package), example shown in Fig. 5.5. The Android-package is written in
475 lines of Java, Python-package is 83 lines and the React-package is 313 lines of
TypeScript. Finally, CAB auto-generates the base code for each algorithm to simplify
the development process (output from cl-algorithm), example shown in Fig. 5.4.
CAB creates 47 lines of Java, 29 lines of Python and 20 lines of TypeScript for each
algorithm. In total, all aspects of our system (not including the algorithm libraries)
amounts to 385 lines of Ruby, 3,623 lines of Java, 251 lines of Python and 442 lines of
TypeScript. The Android libraries are responsible for interfacing with the low-level
5https://www.twilio.com/
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Android sensors and is therefore the most complex part of our system.
We used Android SDK 28 in Java and Python 3.7. The server-side components
for each data collection platform is run inside a Docker container. Node modules
are maintained and packaged using the Node Package Manager version 6.13. We
implemented 19 algorithms and defined 18 new information types.
5.5 Demonstrative Applications
We implemented three different apps using CAB, to demonstrate its expressiveness
and ability to meet diverse requirements. Each app highlights a different aspect of
CAB. For all apps we highlight the reduced effort required by the app designer or the
algorithm developer.
5.5.1 Case Study 1 – GreenGPS
GreenGPS [40] is a study into the fuel efficiency of various road segments. We
implemented a data-collection app which collects the fuel information and the road
name and location of the experiment participants. Fig. 5.6 shows the workflow from
the app designer perspective. First, they specify the information types they wish to
collect from the web interface. This is converted into a requirements.json file and
CAB prepares a data-collection strategy using the repository of available algorithms.
This is shown in the graph in the bottom right of the figure.
Note that CAB automatically compiles all possible algorithms which can produce
the necessary information. In this example, there are three possible algorithms which
output the car-fuel information. The user can either (1) input the fuel level through
a web interface (opened on their phone or on a laptop), (2) read the fuel level through
an OBD dongle or (3) they can text the fuel level to the CAB service. For all data-
collection paths, CAB includes the necessary dependencies into the platform. By auto-
matically compiling all possible methods into the data-collection platform, CAB allows
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Figure 5.6: The app designer inputs the high-level requirements using our web inter-
face (#1). This is translated to a JSON specification file (#2) which is used by CAB
to assemble the necessary algorithmic modules. The dependency graph (#3) lists the
compiled algorithmic modules to meet this requirement. The user-input information
is shown in the gray boxes with a thick black border. The remaining information (gray
boxes), Android algorithms (green), React algorithms (blue) and Python algorithms
(pink) are automatically determined. CAB uses the dependency graph to generate the
individual components for the data-collection platform (#4).
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the app designer to take advantage of the redundancy present in the repository with-
out additional effort.
Finally, CAB materializes the strategy by compiling an Android APK with the
required Android algorithms and launches a Docker container with the Python scripts
needed for the server-side algorithms and a React website with all necessary React-
based algorithms. The sign-up URL is shared with the app designer to distribute to
experiment participants.
The app designer’s effort to build this data-collection platform with multiple re-
dundant paths is significantly reduced to simply specifying two information types on a
web interface drop down, and distributing the sign-up link to experiment participants.
5.5.2 Case Study 2 – Car Sensor Estimation
Next, we demonstrate an app which estimates the vehicle speed, steering wheel
angle and gear position using smartphone sensors. Estimating vehicular sensors is
a useful concept in numerous studies. Several studies use the gyroscope to estimate
the vehicle steering wheel angle [64, 17, 91] and others estimate the vehicle speed
for various purposes such as road pavement monitoring [92] or instantaneous vehicle
speed estimation [114].
In order to use CAB to achieve this, an app designer uses our web interface to
select three information types: car-speed, car-steering, and car-gear. CAB searches
through the algorithms in the repository to determine the required dependencies to
produce the three necessary information types. Fig. 5.7 shows the list of algorithms
and information included in this app. The effort from the app designer perspective
is significantly reduced to just using this web interface to select the required sensors,
and CAB produces the Android app to achieve this goal.
The individual blocks in the compiled application are supplied by algorithm de-





















Figure 5.7: All information and algorithms compiled together for a vehicle sensor
estimation case study. All information blocks are in gray. The input required infor-
mation are the three gray blocks with a thick border. The remaining dependencies
and all algorithms were determined by CAB’s graph search.
Platform # Dev LoC
Android 6 156 / 667 (19%)
Python 1 11 / 116 (8.7%)
React 1 79 / 189 (29.5%)
Table 5.4: Developer-supplied code for each algorithm for vehicle estimation demo
app
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within CAB, algorithm developers can focus on just the estimation logic. CAB gener-
ates function stubs where the required input is passed in as function arguments, as
shown in Fig. 5.4. In this example app, the developer-supplied code only makes up a
fraction of the auto-generated code, as shown in Fig. 5.4.
5.5.3 Case Study 3 – Obstacle/Hazard Warning
We created an obstacle/hazard avoidance app using CAB. Upcoming obstacle warn-
ing is part of navigation apps like Google Maps [41] or Waze [108]. An obstacle/hazard
warning app needs to collect reports from multiple users and warn users of upcoming
hazards based on the vehicle’s current location. CAB compiled a data-collection plat-
form to achieve this containing of 1 Android component to get the user’s location,
1 React component to show the map and accept reports of obstacles and 1 Python
component to collect reports from multiple users and disseminate the information.
The Python algorithm collects the individually reported sightings and shares a
combined sightings report to all drivers. The Python algorithm runs in the same
sandbox for all users using this app, and hence it is easy to pool data across drivers.
This Python script only contains 13 lines of developer-supplied code and 33 lines of
auto-generated code. This highlights the minimal effort required by the algorithm
developer to collect data from multiple drivers. The CAB linking server automatically
routes all information within the data collection campaign.
The React algorithm, shown in Fig. 5.8, consists of a map to display upcoming
obstacles and several buttons using which the user can flag new obstacles observed
near their location. React can be used to create complex user interfaces such as this
interactive map application. The required information (e.g. upcoming obstacles) is
automatically routed into the React application through the properties of the React
components.
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Figure 5.8: Obstacle avoidance/warning app built using CAB. The React algorithm
has a maps interface here it displays upcoming obstacles sightings-map and outputs
a new sighting if the user presses one of the three buttons.
5.6 Evaluation
Here we evaluated the effort reduction for app designers and algorithm developers.
App designers who wish to launch a data-collection platform without the support of
CAB need to engage in multiple steps in addition to programming the data-collection
platform. They need to (1) list the required information for the data-collection plat-
form, (2) develop the tools needed to collect the information, (3) set up a server to
receive the data from multiple users, (4) create a website to distribute the app to
participants, and (5) optionally set up a web hook to receive texts from participants
if that is required for their data-collection platform. CAB significantly shortens this
process by only requiring step #1 — the list of required information. It automatically
completes the remaining steps of the data collection.
In our evaluation we built 18 different functions contained in 10 algorithms span-
ning 3 platforms. A data-collection platform is created using a combination of these
18 functions including any dependencies that are needed for each function. Given the
current state of our repository, CAB can create a total of 8,100 unique applications
by assembling different combinations of the 18 functions. This is a 450× growth in
possible data- collection platforms given only 18 functions contributed by developers.
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Figure 5.9: Lines of code contributed by developer compared to auto-generated and
library components.
We also quantified the effort reduction for algorithm developers. Due to the
automatic code generated by CAB, algorithm developers need only be concerned with
the logic of their algorithm and not with any other aspect of data collection such as
accessing low-level sensors or communicating information with the server. Fig. 5.9
shows the lines of code needed to implement algorithms in each platform compared
to auto-generated code and libraries. Developers only need to contribute 3.9% of
Android code, 9.8% of Python and 33.8% of React code with the logic for each
component. The Android libraries are especially large because they have to interface
with various low-level sensors.
5.7 User Study
We recruited 5 researchers to gauge the usability of CAB. We explained the concept
of CAB and showed them a video demo of CAB6. Three of the participants are vehicular
domain experts and the other two are non-experts. After the presentation of CAB, we
asked them to rate the app designer interface and the algorithm developer workflow.
For both components, the participants answered (Q1) “Would you use CAB for your
future research?” (rated 1 - 7 where 7 is “definitely would use”) and (Q2) “Do you
perceive CAB will reduce your development and deployment effort?” (rated 1 - 7 where
6https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLuEbkT_dQmRIn7JOoDf2JHKQT0n_xfcFc
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7 is “definitely would reduce effort”).
Below we summarize the survey results and some recurring comments raised by
participants in free-form discussion. We uncovered several practical challenges that
must be addressed when deploying CAB.
App Designer. Participants found the app designer interface to be very useful
and would consider using it in their own research (score=6.7, std=0.4). One domain-
expert researcher said
“[App development is] really frustrating – if I can use [CAB] automatically
to do that, it would reduce the learning curve for many novices. Even for
researchers it would reduce effort significantly”
This sentiment was shared by other participants as well. They largely found
that the app designer interface would reduce the effort needed to develop such data
collection apps (score=6.7, std=0.49).
In free-form discussion multiple participants commented that the definition of
information types needs to be well-documented. One participant said the documen-
tation would help answer “How can I know if CAB can help with my purpose?”.
Algorithm Developer. Participants were largely interested in using the al-
gorithm development workflow for their future research (score=6.4, std=0.8). The
participant who gave the lowest score (5) suggested that a graphical user-interface
would be better for defining the algorithm specifications. Participants suggested that
the specification files and script invocation doesn’t need to be exposed to developers.
With such a user interface, they would be more willing to use the system (score=6)
with the following quote on its simplicity:
“I already have the algorithm. So I already write that. So I just copy it.
That’s very convenient, it will not take much time.”
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The participants agreed that the algorithm generation would reduce the effort
needed by algorithm developers (score=6.8, std=0.4).
General Comments. Multiple participants commented on the best practices for
contributing to the CAB repository. As multiple developers create algorithms to be
used with CAB, we need a standard code-review procedure to ensure the algorithms
meet quality and accuracy standards. One participant suggested offline testing of
the algorithms by feeding in trace files for input and verifying their output values.
However, the details of the open source collaboration of CAB is outside the scope
of this work. We foresee answering these questions as we deploy CAB and grow a
community of contributors and users.
5.8 Related Work
Vehicular research spans a diverse set of areas including driver monitoring [87,
54, 96], road anomaly detection [32, 3, 103], and vehicular security [72, 49, 68].
Due to the lack of a very flexible reconfigurable data collection builder, most of
these researchers build their own data collection tools. This is a high barrier of
entry for non-technical researchers who would like to enter this field and investigate
vehicle-related research questions. Furthermore, since platforms are built for a specific
purpose, they often lack the flexibility to take advantage of redundant ways to measure
the same information.
Most data collection apps have similar requirements. They must all first access
and process low level sensor data from the vehicle or the phone. This requires under-
standing how to interface with different hardware devices and consolidating all the
information in one place. Next they often need to upload the data to a remote server
for later processing, and handle user management of the uploaded data. In many
cases, the data needs to be communicated between multiple aspects of the applica-
tion that is deployed on the user’s phone. A general data collection platform needs
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to address these requirements.
We present an overview of the current state of vehicular data collection platforms
below.
5.8.1 Specialized Data Collection
Certain use cases require custom-built data collection tools and therefore cannot
be automated with a general configurable tool builder. For instance, IVBSS [42] and
collects data from modified Honda Accords and Bender et al. [8] require integration
with the vehicle’s LiDAR and other sensors. Other data collection platforms require
adding sensors to vehicles. The Safety Pilot Model Deployment [10] outfits cars with a
DSRC antenna, an aftermarket safety device and sometimes with a MobileEye camera
[100].CANOPNR [95] is an OBD-II data logger built using Arduino which can run
local processing and offload the data to the cloud. This platform was used to study
slippery road conditions [30]. BigRoad [64] uses an easy-to-deploy data collection
platform [63] consisting of an IMU sensor attached to steering wheel angle and a
smartphone app. These research undertakings require heavy engineering effort and
must require custom platforms to suit their special needs.
5.8.2 General Data Collection
Other vehicular research efforts can benefit from a general data collection builder
tool. For instance, SenseMyCity [84] is a crowdsourcing mobile platform that collects
data from the smartphone and the vehicle through the OBD-II port. This has been
used to study city-wide fuel consumption [83] and the mental state of bus drivers [85].
Chen et al. [17] built V-Sense, which uses smartphone-based sensing to detect steering
maneuvers. Walhstörm et al. [103] include many such examples in their survey. These
investigations can be expedited by the existence of a simple data collection tool builder
which can be configured to meet their specific needs. This would enable non-technical
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researchers to undertake similar research problems.
CARLOG [52] defines a programming abstraction on top of vehicular events. Their
programming abstraction can be composed to find driving events such as turning or
reckless driving. In contrast, CAB defines functionality as callback functions which can
perform procedural computation and store internal state. Information and events is
composed in CAB by routing information from one algorithmic module to another.
In addition, we also provide other convenient functionality such as automatic code
generation and a web-UI to generate the data collection campaign.
5.8.3 Reusable Data-Collection Platforms
There are a few notable platforms which have been re-used across multiple inves-
tigations. The CarTel hardware data collection platform [48] was customized with
additional sensors and used in several follow up work [31, 71, 32, 97]. However, this
platform wasn’t designed to be easily extended to additional use cases and must be
manually modified for each investigation. In contrast, CAB can be easily extended for
future required functionality.
Sensibility Testbed [82] has a web interface through which researchers can sub-
mit their data collection tasks. It automatically deploys the task to users who have
installed the Sensibility Testbed app. This tool makes it very easy to do data col-
lection, however it does not allow for developers to prototype any real-time custom
functionality on top of the data collection platform. CAB generates the data collection
platform which allows customization and extension to meet each data collection need.
HealthSense [24] provides a user interface to define clinical trials, distribute to
participants and collect data. In contrast, CAB also allows for rapid prototyping
of new algorithmic ideas. Using the auto-generated code, algorithm developers can
extend the functionality of CAB to add novel user interfaces or engage in real-time
processing of user data.
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5.9 Discussion & Future Work
Communicating App Requirements CAB accepts the requirements as a JSON
specification file (Fig. 5.10c) and assembles the data-collection platform. We created a
simple website to create this requirements file, but there is much room for exploration
and investigation in this area. Ultimately, the goal of a good interface is to learn the
user’s intent and requirements and automatically translate that to a CAB input file.
This may be done using natural language processing akin to many general voice
assistants such as Amazon’s Alexa or domain-specific voice assistants such as Clinc.7
An investigation into the most natural form of input is outside the scope of this work
but worth further investigation.
Application to Personal Informatics The core concepts of CAB are applicable
more broadly than vehicular data collection. We foresee the application of the same
tools to personal health informatics, as seen in related work [24, 9]. Personal infor-
matics is a rich area of research as we can infer the user’s mental state or emotional
level based on numerous low-level sensors, such as their heart rate or daily movement.
Such informatics can help raise self-awareness of the user’s own state of mind and
well-being.
Expansion to Additional Sensors Future work can expand CAB to additional
hardware sensors such as wearables or rich-vehicle sensors such as camera, radar or
LiDAR. CAB naturally has support for acquiring data from one platform and send-
ing it to another platform for processing. Expanding to other sensors will leverage
this functionality to allow easy access and rapid prototyping of novel applications.
For example, Augmented Vehicle Reality [81] shares LiDAR point cloud information





We have presented CAB, an on-demand vehicular data-collection app builder. CAB
accepts high-level requirements from researchers and developers, and creates a custom
data-collection app to meet their needs. The app is easily distributed through the
CAB server and doesn’t require any programming expertise to launch a custom data-
collection campaign.
CAB compiles each on-demand data-collection platform using algorithmic modules
contributed to the shared repository by developers. Using a shared understanding
of information types that are requested by the user, CAB automatically resolves al-
gorithmic dependencies and builds an app to meet the requirements. By assembling
different sets of algorithms, CAB can create numerous unique data-collection apps us-
ing just a small number of algorithms. In this work, we created 18 algorithms which
can be composed to create 8,100 unique applications.
We have demonstrated CAB’s versatility by building three complex data-collection
apps. CAB significantly reduces the programming effort needed to achieve complex
app functionality, requiring as little as 4% of the Android code that would otherwise
be needed. Through a usability study, we found that researchers find that CAB reduces
the effort for both data collection and for algorithm development, and are likely to
use CAB for their research or app development needs.
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(d) App designer strategy
Figure 5.10: Specification files
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CHAPTER VI
Thesis Contributions and Conclusion
This thesis made three main contributions towards unifying diverse sensor streams.
By unifying sensor streams, we can take full advantage of the information learned by
any individual sensor or vehicle. We built systems which utilized sensor redundancy
and solved problems in two different domains.
CAN-bus Injection Detection. First, we developed a system called CarSec which
uses smartphone sensors to detect if the vehicular sensors are deviating from their
expected value. We estimated six (6) different vehicular sensors and measured their
accuracy under many realistic driving scenarios. We characterized CAN-bus injection
attacks found in literature and demonstrated CarSec’s ability to exploit the sensor
redundancy found in phones for their detection.
Driving Hazard Detection. Next, we developed a system called Ubi which uses
GPS trajectories of nearby cars to detect dangerous driving hazards. Ubi detects
stationary and mobile driving hazards using GPS trajectories of nearby vehicles. We
modeled the mobility of these hazards to predict their location and warn drivers early
on as they approach the hazard. By leveraging the GPS sensing redundancy from
multiple nearby vehicles, we are able to make the roads safer and provide earlier
warning about dangerous hazards ahead.
135
Data-Collection App Building. Finally, we consolidated the main requirements
for building vehicular data collection applications which leverage redundant sensors
into a data-collection app builder called CAB. In contrast to existing tools, CAB is
designed so that non-technical users can easily create and launch a data-collection
campaign for their research purposes. Moreover, CAB is designed to be easily extended
by developers and supports development in three different platforms – Android (Java),




There are several interesting directions to follow up this thesis.
Extensions to CarSec. CarSec uses three sensors, GPS, IMU and magnetometer,
to replicate six vehicular sensors. As a possible extension of this work, one may
consider using the camera and microphone sensors found in smartphones. Every
year smartphone cameras improve. Modern smartphones even have depth cameras
and multiple cameras for a wide field of view. This could serve as an additional
source of redundancy for detecting attacks. By replicating the vision of in-vehicle
LiDAR or camera, we can leverage smartphone cameras to the detect adversarial
machine learning attacks [79], or sensor blinding attacks [80, 110]. If we can share
the extracted camera information across vehicles, we can extend sensor redundancy
and explore a wide range of attacks. Similar work on vision sharing between vehicles
was done by Qiu et al. [81].
Extensions to Ubi. The graph search algorithm used in Ubi is a general repre-
sentation of hazard mobility. It can represent diverse hazard mobility and used to
represent how cars interact with the hazard, such as how they slow down or speed
up as they approach the hazard. We can explore the full limits of such a tool by
extending Ubi to other types of hazards not explored in this thesis. This could be
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extended to detect stray animals on the road which have a distinct mobility pattern.
Being able to detect animals and report in real-time could potentially can save lives
by early warnings.
Extensions to CAB. We developed a flexible and extensible data-collection platform
for vehicular data-collection research. A possible extension of this work involves
expanding the development surface to different platforms. For example, currently
in order to access low-level sensors on the phone, a developer has to use Android-
based algorithms available within CAB. If we add support for React-Native or Swift, a
user can also access low-level sensors on iPhones or other mobile operating systems,
thereby increasing the coverage and impact of CAB.
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[94] Isaac Skog and Peter Händel. “Indirect instantaneous car-fuel consumption
measurements”. In: IEEE Transactions on Instrumentation and Measurement
63.12 (2014), pp. 3190–3198.
[95] Kristian Smith and Jeffrey Miller. “OBDII data logger design for large-scale
deployments”. In: Intelligent Transportation Systems-(ITSC), 2013 16th Inter-
national IEEE Conference on. IEEE, 2013, pp. 670–674. isbn: 1-4799-2914-X.
[96] Ines Teyeb et al. “A Drowsy Driver Detection System Based on a New Method
of Head Posture Estimation”. en. In: Intelligent Data Engineering and Auto-
mated Learning – IDEAL 2014. Ed. by Emilio Corchado et al. Lecture Notes
in Computer Science. Springer International Publishing, 2014, pp. 362–369.
isbn: 978-3-319-10840-7.
[97] Arvind Thiagarajan et al. “VTrack: accurate, energy-aware road traffic delay
estimation using mobile phones”. In: Proceedings of the 7th ACM conference
on embedded networked sensor systems. ACM, 2009, pp. 85–98. isbn: 1-60558-
519-X.
[98] TowerSec. Harman Automotive Cyber Security - TowerSec - Automotive Cyber
Security (a HARMAN company). http://tower-sec.com/. 2018.
[99] Martin Treiber and Ame Kesting. “An open-source microscopic traffic simula-
tor”. In: IEEE Intelligent Transportation Systems Magazine 2.3 (2010), pp. 6–
13.
[100] UMTRI. Safety Pilot: Model Deployment. http : / / safetypilot . umtri .
umich.edu/index.php?content=technology_overview. 2018.
[101] Verizon. Drive Smarter With Connected Car Technology — Hum by Verizon.
https://www.hum.com/. 2018.
[102] Bimal Viswanath et al. “Towards Detecting Anomalous User Behavior in On-
line Social Networks.” In: USENIX Security Symposium. 2014, pp. 223–238.
[103] Johan Wahlström, Isaac Skog, and Peter Händel. “Smartphone-based vehi-
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